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ABSTRACT 
Researcher: Yi-Fan (Tom) Chen 
Title: The TAiwan Civil Aviation safety REporting (TACARE) System in 
Aircraft Maintenance: An Evaluation Of The Acceptance Of Voluntary 
Incident Reporting Programs For Maintenance Personnel In Taiwan 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Science in Aeronautics 
Year: 2010 
The purpose of this research was to examine the effectiveness of the TAiwan Civil 
Aviation safety REporting (TACARE) system for maintenance personnel to improve 
aircraft safety. The research evaluated what are the issues that affect the participation of 
the TACARE system. The understandings of the safety culture for maintenance personnel 
in Taiwan were also analyzed. The research was conducted with a mixed method. The 
survey and interview were developed to sample the acceptance and opinions regarding 
the TACARE system for the maintenance personnel in Taiwan. Statistical analysis of the 
data from 605 survey respondents and 9 interviewees concluded the maintenance 
personnel in Taiwan lacked the necessary knowledge of voluntary safety reporting. The 
results yielded the agreement with importance of promoting voluntary safety reporting 
programs in Taiwanese aircraft maintenance industry. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
Safety has always been a concern in the inherently high-risk aviation industry. In 
the Bird Triangle theory, Figure 1 shows that accidents have been rare. However, there 
have been many errors and incidents that preceded these infrequent major accidents. For 
every major accident, there were 15 minor accidents and 300 incidents. The goal of 
voluntary reporting is to prevent a tragic fatal accident by means of gathering, analyzing, 
and propagating these 300 incidents and even more safety related issues through the, 
reports and share them with the entire aviation community (McVenes & Chidester, 2005). 
1 major accident 
15 minor accidents 
with damage and injury 
300 incidents and 
"near misses" 
15.000 observed 
15,000 work error* 
V 
Hazardous E\ents 
Figure 1. The Bird Triangle (Adapted from McVenes & Chidester, 2005). 
"While fatal accidents are extremely rare and incidents of injury and minor 
damage occur occasionally, near-misses and work errors can take place on a daily basis" 
(McVenes & Chidester. 2005. p. 305). Most of these were unobserved and unreported, 
but they are still environmental threats or operating errors. However, the) can lead to a 
fatal accident under the right circumstances. If those errors can be significantly reduced. 
1 
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then the accident rate can also be reduced. 
Before voluntary safety programs were implemented, information about hazards 
and safety problems became available only after an accident occurred. This reactive 
method has become inadequate for further safety improvements in the aviation industry. 
Voluntary safety reporting programs have enabled the airline industry to detect hazards 
and vulnerabilities in the air transportation system. Reports gathered from front-line 
employees have increased the possibility of seeing not only what happened, but also why 
it happened (Yeh, 2009). According to the statistical data from the Federal Aviation-
Administration (FAA), voluntary incident reporting programs, such as the Aviation 
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), have 
discovered 90% of the problems which are previously unknown to the air carrier industry 
or the FAA (Farrow, 2009). As a result, safety recommendations have been generated 
from the information in those incident reports and helped to reduce the accident rate. The 
mean to enhance aviation safety has now transformed from accident investigations 
(reactive) to voluntary reporting (proactive and predictive). 
Background of the Problem 
Human errors have become the primary threat to aviation safety. Human factors 
have been involved with approximately 80% of jet aircraft accidents. Meanwhile, 
maintenance errors have contributed to 15% of commercial jet aircraft accidents (Boeing 
Company, n.d.). In addition to the flight crew, maintenance has become the second 
highest contributor to aircraft accidents. Frequently, maintenance mistakes and errors are 
almost undetectable and uncorrectable until the next inspection, or problems are 
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experienced later during the flight (Patankar & Taylor, 2004a). Therefore, most of the 
safety issues remained unseen by others until an accident or incident occurs. 
Human errors in maintenance not only lead to fatal accidents, but also add costs to 
air carrier operations. According to one study, 20-30% of in-flight engine shutdowns and 
50% of delays and cancellations are caused by human errors. Meanwhile, 48,800 
non-airworthy aircraft are dispatched each year as a result of maintenance errors. The 
cost of flight cancellations and delays is steep. The cancellation of a commercial flight 
can cost an airline $50,000. The average cost for the aircraft to return to the gate is • 
$15,000, and the average ground damage incident costs $70,000. One airline estimates 
$100 million a year is lost, and the total lost revenue from ramp accidents is $2.5 billion 
annually (Boquet, 2009). 
The voluntary reporting systems for aircraft maintenance, such as the Aviation 
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), have 
been successful in the United States. They accumulate two thousand reports from aircraft 
maintenance personnel every year (FAA, 2009). These safety programs for aircraft 
maintenance are considered effective tools to enhance aviation safety. On the contrary, 
Taiwan's Aviation Safety Council (ASC), which is similar to the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB), has suffered from insufficient incident reports in its voluntary 
safety reporting system, known as the TAiwan Civil Aviation safety REporting 
(TACARE) system. 
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Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness and acceptance of the 
TACARE system for maintenance personnel in Taiwan. Taiwan's ASC established a 
voluntary reporting program for its civil aviators in 1999, known as the TACARE 
system. To date, this system has accumulated a minimal number of incident reports from 
maintenance personnel. Accordingly, this study has been designed to address the need for 
voluntary incident reports concerning civil aircraft maintenance in Taiwan. 
Significance of the Problem 
Statistics of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA, n.d.) in Taiwan show 
there are 2,210 certified mechanics in Taiwan. However, only a small number of them 
from air carriers and maintenance facilities participate in the TACARE system. This 
study examined the safety culture among Taiwanese maintenance personnel, and 
identified factors affecting the TACARE system. 
Maintenance personnel's perceptions contribute to the effectiveness of the 
voluntary safety reporting system, TACARE. Certain cultural personalities of the 
Taiwanese maintenance personnel, company policies, and aviation regulations have been 
major influences in an effective aviation safety reporting system. To improve the 
acceptance of voluntary reporting programs in the Taiwanese aviation industry, the 
effectiveness of the U.S. voluntary aviation safety reporting system (such as ASRS and 
ASAP) was compared to the TACARE system. 
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Delimitations 
This study discussed the importance of establishing voluntary safety reporting 
programs and integrating the concept of just culture among the maintenance personnel in 
Taiwan. Due to the sensitive nature of the data that have been received in the programs, 
de-identified examples have been utilized to illustrate different factors that may have 
been encountered in the real environment of the Taiwan aviation industry. The existing 
TACARE program has been addressed in the current study to evaluate the acceptance of 
voluntary reporting, but this research does not conduct a cost-effective analysis of the 
system. 
Definition of Terms 
Aviation Safety Council (ASC): An independent investigation agency in Taiwan. Its 
function is the same as the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in the United 
States (U.S.). The ASC is the agency in charge of the voluntary reporting system, 
TAiwan Confidential Aviation safety REporting system (TACARE). 
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP): One of the United States Federal Aviation 
Administration's voluntary safety programs. This is a self disclosure program utilized by 
air carrier and repair station employees. 
Effectiveness: The degree to which implementing the voluntary safety programs in the 
Taiwan air carrier industry yields desired safety outcomes. 
Event Review Committee (ERC): The ERC is responsible for reviewing and analyzing all 
ASAP reports that are submitted. It is also in charge of deciding what reports qualify for 
ASAP, identifying problems and risks from the reports, and providing solutions for those 
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problems and risks (FAA, 2002). 
TAiwan Confidential Aviation safety REporting system (TACARE): A voluntary reporting 
system in Taiwan designed to invite flight crews, maintenance personnel, air traffic 
controllers, and the general public to report irregular events and hazards in the course of 
normal flight operations. 
Safety Management System (SMS): A process-driven and proactive program that 
continuously collects and analyzes sizable volumes of data, providing a principled basis 
for the definition of activities and the allocation of resources to address safety concerns in 
a proactive manner (Galotti, Rao, & Maurino, 2006). 
Just Culture: People recognize that although punishment serves little purpose from a 
safety perspective, punitive action may be necessary in some circumstances, and there is 
a need to define the line between acceptable and unacceptable actions. 
Major Accident: An accident in which a 14 CFR 121 aircraft was destroyed, there were 
multiple fatalities, or there was one fatality and a 14 CFR 121 aircraft was substantially 
damaged (NTSB, 2010). 
Incident: An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an 
aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of operations (NTSB, 2010). 
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Chapter II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Accidents in commercial aviation have traditionally been viewed and treated as 
events where lessons could be learned to improve future safety. However, these lessons 
have often been learned with an unacceptable price -the loss of life. Today, even though 
the safety of aviation has been improved dramatically, maintenance errors have still 
caused several fatal accidents and incidents in recent years. Those accidents and other 
incidents raise public concerns on the airworthiness of the aircraft. 
Maintenance Related Accidents 
In the U.S., the most recent, catastrophic accident that involved maintenance 
problems was Alaska Airlines Flight 261 on January 31, 2000. Due to the malfunction of 
the jackscrew of the vertical tail trim system, the MD-83 jet plunged uncontrollably into 
the Pacific Ocean about 2.7 miles north of Anacapa Island, California (NTSB, 2002). A 
series of factors contributed to the failure of the jackscrew. Inadequate lubrication of the 
jackscrew which was caused by the extension of the lubrication interval was the main 
cause of the accident. However, the airline also failed to address several related problems, 
such as (a) imprecise procedures, (b) poor training, and (c) lack of supervision. The 
continuous negligence of improper maintenance actions resulted in the loss of 88 lives. 
In Taiwan, there was one fatal accident and one incident which involved 
maintenance errors in the last 10 years. One of most serious accidents in Taiwan's 
aviation history was China Airlines Flight 611. On May 25, 2002, due to improper repairs 
and inspection from a previous accident, in which the airplane had a tail strike 20 years 
earlier, the Boeing 747-200 airplane broke up over the Taiwan Strait while cruising at 
35,000 feet (ASC, 2002). This was due to an improper repair which did not follow the 
correct instructions from the manufacturer. As a result of this, and over 20 years of wear 
on the aircraft, a structure failure in the tail section occurred. The aircraft disintegrated in 
the air and resulted in the loss of 225 people on board. In 2006, the 84-year-old former 
China Airlines engineer conducting this repair was being prosecuted for negligent 
homicide (United Daily News, 2006). 
Another incident that recently occurred also involved maintenance errors. On 
August 20, 2007, a Boeing 737-800 operated by China Airlines landed and taxied into the 
apron at Naha Airport. Due to the detached downstop assembly from the slat track, when 
the slat was retracted, the component punctured a hole in the fuel tank. Fuel that was 
leaking from the fuel tank caught fire and the aircraft was engulfed in flames (JTSB, 
2009). The aircraft was badly damaged and destroyed by fire. Fortunately, all 165 people 
on board were evacuated from the aircraft and there were no fatalities or injuries. Due to 
the design fault of the assembly, the assembly was not able to be maintained and repaired 
properly. Neither the manufacturer nor the airlines had addressed this issue sufficiently. 
Also, both the maintainer and supervisor who perform the maintenance on the assembly 
did not report any difficulty on that task. 
From ASC statistics, there have been five fatal accidents involving Taiwanese air 
carriers from 1998 to 2007. As previously mentioned, one resulted from maintenance 
errors; hence, maintenance errors were causal in 20% of Taiwan's fatal aircraft accidents 
during the 10-year period. This figure does not include incidents or near-misses. 
Countless maintenance problems have cost human lives and revenue, yet the safety 
9 
standards in maintenance are not followed. Therefore, human errors in aircraft 
maintenance need to be addressed in order to prevent more accidents. 
Human Factors in Aircraft Maintenance 
Human factors in aviation has traditionally concentrated on aircrew and air traffic 
control errors, but the increasing number of maintenance and inspection errors has 
contributed to the rise of human factors research and interventions in this area. James T. 
Reason's Swiss Cheese Model (1997; Figure 2) demonstrated that a series of inadequate 
maintenance actions will result in a fatal accident. Consequently, the study of 
maintenance errors as precursors to incidents and accidents has become essential. 
Figure 2. The Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation (Adapted from Reason, 1997). 
Since the objective of voluntary incident reporting is to analyze and prevent 
incidents and accidents, it is critical for voluntary safety programs to conduct continuous 
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reviewing processes to identify potential hazards to flight safety. Human error models 
and taxonomies have facilitated the identification of human factors problem areas as well 
as provided a basis for the development of tailored intervention strategies. For 
maintenance errors, two major models to identify and analyze the problem are the Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) and Dupont's Dirty Dozen. 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
The Swiss Cheese model of accident causation is a model used in the risk analysis 
and management of human systems. It was originally set out by James T. Reason in 1990. 
Drawing upon Reason's (1990) concept of latent and active failures, the HFACS 
describes four levels of failure: (a) unsafe acts, (b) preconditions for unsafe acts, (c) 
unsafe supervision, and (d) organizational influences (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
Unsafe acts can be classified into two categories: errors and violations (Reason, 
1990). Errors represent the mental or physical activities of individuals that fail to achieve 
their intended outcome. Violations, on the other hand, refer to the willful disregard for 
the rules and regulations that govern the safety of flight. The categories of errors and 
violations expand further to include three basic error types: (a) skill-based, (b) decision, 
and (c) perceptual and two forms of violations: routine and exceptional (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003). Unsafe acts can be directly linked to nearly 80 % of all aviation 
accidents (Boeing, n.d.). One of the most noticeable problems is simply "human error." 
Those errors in operations are mostly caused by latent conditions in the organization. 
Within the preconditions level, there are three contributing factors: (a) condition 
of operators, (b) personal factors, and (c) environmental factors. The condition of 
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operators does influence performance on the job. In this category, there are three types of 
conditions: (a) adverse mental states, (b) adverse physiological states, and (c) 
physical/mental limitations. Those factors affect human performance (i.e., fatigue and 
disorientation). Personal factors refer to preconditions for unsafe acts that are created by 
people, such as communication skills. They have been divided into two general 
categories: Crew Resource Management (CRM) and personal readiness. Environmental 
factors (i.e., noise and automation) can also contribute to the substandard conditions of 
operators and hence to unsafe acts. They can be identified within two categories: physical 
and technological (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
Reason (1990) also traced the causal chain of events back up the supervisory 
chain of command. HFACS has identified four categories of unsafe supervision: (a) 
Inadequate Supervision refers to the failure of supervisor to provide guidance, training 
opportunities, leadership, and motivation, as well as the proper role model to be emulated; 
(b) Planned Inappropriate Operations means that individuals are put at unacceptable risk, 
crew rest is jeopardized, and ultimately performance is adversely affected; (c) Failed to 
Correct a Known Problem refers to those instances when deficiencies among individuals, 
equipment, training or other related safety areas are "known" to the supervisor, yet are 
allowed to continue unabated; and (d) Supervisory Violations are reserved for those 
instances when existing rules and regulations are willfully disregarded by supervisors 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). A typical example in this level is the accident of Alaska 
261, which was caused by inappropriate inspection. 
For Organizational Influences, decisions of upper-level management directly 
affect supervisory practices, as well as the conditions and actions of operators. The most 
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elusive of latent failures revolve around issues related to (a) Resource Management, (b) 
Organizational Climate, and (c) Operational Process. Resource Management 
encompasses the realm of corporate-level decision making regarding the allocation and 
maintenance of organizational assets such as human resources and equipment. 
Organizational Climate is defined as the situation-based consistencies in the 
organization's treatment of individuals. Operational Process refers to corporate decisions 
and rules that govern the activities within an organization, including the establishment 
and use of standardized operating procedures and formal methods for maintaining * 
oversight between the workforce and management (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). One 
of the organizational influences is the chain of command in the military, which often 
causes accidents by following superior's orders unquestionably. 
HFACS framework bridges the gap between theory and practice by providing 
investigators with a comprehensive, user-friendly tool for identifying and classifying the 
human causes of aviation accidents. The ultimate goal is to reduce the aviation accident 
rate through systematic, data-driven investment. 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System - Maintenance Extension 
Similar to the original Reason's Swiss Cheese model (1997), the HFACS -
Maintenance Extension (ME) consists of four error categories: (a) Management 
Conditions, (b) Maintainer Conditions, (c) Working Conditions, and (d) Maintainer1 Acts. 
Management Conditions that cause active failures includes both organizational and 
supervisory. Maintainer Conditions that can contribute to an active failure include 
medical, crew coordination, and readiness. Working Conditions that can contribute to an 
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active failure include environmental, equipment, and workspace. Management, 
Maintainer, and Working Conditions are latent factors that can impact a maintainer's 
performance and can contribute to an active failure, an unsafe Maintainer Act. Unsafe 
Maintainer Acts (errors and violations) may lead directly to a mishap (Schmidt, Lawson, 
& Figlock, n.d.). 
HFACS-ME is effective in capturing the nature of and relationships among latent 
conditions and active failures. It captures factors leading to maintenance error from a 
systematic approach. The insights gained provide a solid perspective for the development 
of potential intervention strategies (Schmidt et al., n.d.). 
The Dirty Dozen 
Besides the HFACS, the Dirty Dozen illustrates the contributing factors for 
human behaviors. In 1993, Transport Canada developed a series of training courses for 
mechanics, which would serve to reduce maintenance errors with Dr. Gordon Dupont. In 
close collaboration with the aviation industry, Transport Canada and Dr. Dupont 
subsequently identified 12 issues in maintenance errors, known as the Dupont's Dirty 
Dozen (1997). The following illustrates those 12 factors in detail (Dupont, 2009): 
1. Lack of communication - It is simply the failure to exchange information. In 
good communication, the mental pictures must match. 
2. Complacency - This is where someone becomes so self-satisfied that a person 
can lose awareness of dangers. It is also called overconfidence as people 
become more proficient at what they do. 
3. Lack of knowledge - With constantly changing technology, this contributor to 
an error is more common than people think. It also refers to a lack of training 
to perform certain tasks. 
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4. Distraction - It is anything that takes someone's mind off the job at hand even 
for an instant. Any distraction can cause people to think further ahead than 
they should. 
5. Lack of teamwork - The larger an organization becomes, the more common 
this contributing factor is. Because teamwork is constantly evolving and 
changing, it is hard to gain and very easy to lose. 
6. Fatigue - It is insidious, and the person fails to realize just how much his/her 
judgment is impaired until it is too late. 
7. Lack of resources - Using improper equipment to safely carry out a task has 
caused many fatal accidents. 
8. Pressure - To be on time is ever-present in the aviation industry. Often, 
technicians have to rush to finish jobs. 
9. Lack of assertiveness - In failing to speak up when things do not seem right has 
resulted in many fatal accidents. Assertiveness also calls for listening to the 
views of others before making a decision. 
10. Stress - It is the subconscious response to the demands placed upon a person. 
Everyone experiences stresses at work. It is not all bad until it becomes 
excessive, and people become distressed. 
11. Lack of awareness - It occurs when there is a lack of alertness and vigilance 
in observing. This usually occurs with very experienced persons who fail to 
reason out possible consequences to what may normally be a good practice. 
12. Norms - It is the short term for "normal," or the way things actually are done 
around an organization. Norms are unwritten rules followed or tolerated by 
the majority of a group. Negative norms are those that detract from an 
established safety standard. 
Since the development of the Dirty Dozen, maintenance personnel at most of the 
air carriers have routinely received training to recognize the Dirty Dozen and prevent 
their occurrence. However, the Dirty Dozen puts more emphasis individual performance 
rather than the entire organization. It only can identify the causes of maintainer's unsafe 
acts and preconditions. 
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Voluntary Incident Reporting 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 13 (2001) Chapter 8 
Section 8.2 recommends that "A State should establish a voluntary incident reporting 
system to facilitate the collection of information that may not be captured by a mandatory 
incident reporting system." Section 8.3 (p. 8-1) expounds that "A voluntary incident 
reporting system shall be non-punitive and afford protection to the sources of the 
information." The FAA also characterizes voluntary incident reporting as follows: (a) 
involve partnership and trust between regulator and regulated, (b) require some form of 
data collection, analysis and corrective action, and (c) program oversight from a single 
authority that specializes in voluntary programs (Farrow, 2010). 
The main idea of reporting is to contribute to organizational learning. It is to help 
prevent recurrence by making systemic changes that aim to address some of the basic 
circumstances in which work went awry (Dekker, 2007). In aviation maintenance, safety 
is dependent on technical reliability of the hardware and human reliability of the 
maintenance personnel. Voluntary incident reporting programs acknowledge the 
complexity of this human-machine interface as well as the human relationships involved 
and provide a mean to address errors that impact the overall safety of aviation 
maintenance (FAA, 2009). Voluntary incident reporting programs have become valuable 
sources to study the human factors concerning aviation safety, especially maintenance 
where the problems often cannot be seen through inspections or self audits. 
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Aviation Safety Reporting System 
In 1974, Trans World Airlines (TWA) Flight 514 had an accident in which the 
aircraft descended below the minimum safe attitude specified for the area in which it was 
flying and crashed into a Virginia mountain top. Only 6 weeks before the TWA crash, a 
United Airlines crew had narrowly escaped the same fate utilizing the same approach and 
location. The problem with approach procedure and the differences in its interpretation 
between pilots and controllers were brought into United's internal reporting system called 
Flight Safety Awareness Program. If this incident report had been shared industry wide, 
the TWA accident may have been prevented (NASA, 1986). 
After TWA Flight 514's fatal accident, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
instituted the voluntary ASRS program on April 30, 1975, designed to encourage the 
identification and reporting of deficiencies and discrepancies in the system (FAA, 1997). 
The U.S. was one of the first nations to develop a voluntary incident reporting program. 
ASRS was established under a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the FAA 
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). This cooperative safety 
reporting program invites pilots, controllers, flight attendants, maintenance personnel, 
and other users of the National Airspace System (NAS), or any other person, to report to 
NASA actual or potential discrepancies and deficiencies involving the safety of aviation 
operations. Based on information obtained from this program, the FAA will take 
corrective action as necessary to remedy defects or deficiencies in the NAS. The reports 
may also provide data for improving the current system and planning for a future system 
(FAA, 1997). 
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One of the most critical aspects for a successful incident reporting system is the 
protection of the participating parties. Incidents would not be reported by individuals 
unless they were protected from disciplinary and regulatory punishment. As a result, Title 
14 of the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 91.25 prohibits the use of any reports 
submitted to NASA under ASRS in any disciplinary action, except information 
concerning criminal offenses. In addition to the protection provided by Part 91.25, ASRS 
has established a comprehensive immunity program that provides total confidentiality for 
the reporting parties (FAA, 1997). The ASRS, however, has limitations concerning* 
immunity. Immunity can be provided to a reporter when: (a) the contributor has filed an 
ASRS form within 10 days of the incident, (b) the reporter could not have been involved 
in a reckless operation, gross negligence, or willful misconduct, and (c) the violation did 
not result in an accident (NASA, 1986). 
Since 1975, the ASRS has accepted over 500,000 reports and received 
approximately 47,000 reports each year; 60% of reports were filed from ASAP reports 
(Farrow, 2010). The ASRS has collected the data and contributed to the enhancement and 
improvement of aviation safety throughout the U.S. It also has been internationally 
recognized as a strong contributor to aviation safety. With the success of the ASRS, the 
FAA has introduced several voluntary safety programs that have proved to be effective 
afterward. 
Aviation Safety Action Program 
The ASAP was developed to further analyze the individual carriers' operations. 
Similar to its NASA counterpart, ASAP provides a platform whereby employees of 
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participating air carriers and repair station certificate holders can identify and report 
safety issues to management and to the FAA for resolution. These programs are designed 
to encourage participation from various employee groups, such as flight crewmembers, 
mechanics, flight attendants, and dispatchers (FAA, 2002). 
The objective of the ASAP has been to encourage air carrier and repair station 
employees to voluntarily report safety information that may be critical to identifying 
potential precursors to accidents (FAA, 2002). Four challenges in implementing the 
ASAP have been (a) recognizing contributing factors, (b) analyzing a high volume of 
data, (c) following through on actions beyond correcting individuals, and (d) providing 
operational feedback and publications (Chidester, 2003). 
To date, there have been 151 programs for pilots, maintenance personnel, 
dispatchers, and flight attendants across 69 operators. Those programs receive 45,000 
reports annually. Among them, there are 42 maintenance ASAPs, which receives about 
2,000 reports from maintenance personnel in the U.S every year. In contrast with ASAP, 
ASRS has been the all-inclusive reporting program. Anyone involved in U.S. aviation 
can report into the program or extract information out of the program. On the other hand, 
the ASAP has been action-oriented. Individual and organizational concerns and events 
can be tightly monitored and controlled because only one organizational entity has been 
involved (Farrow, 2010). 
An ASAP program is dependent on employee-management trust. The ASAP 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) establishes the basic agreement between 
employees, management, and the regulator. The MOU establishes corporate commitment 
and serves as a foundational reference in the event of challenging cases. This document 
19 
needs to be co-developed by the company and employee representatives. The MOU 
include the voluntary disclosure policy to encourage employees of air carriers 
participating in the programs to disclose information which may include possible 
violations of Title 14 CFR Part 91.25 without fear of punitive enforcement sanctions or 
company disciplinary action. Events report under a program that involves an apparent 
violation of the regulations on the part of air carriers is handled under the MOU (FAA, 
2002). 
Since ASAP's goal is to analyze and prevent incidents and accidents, it is critical 
to conduct continuous reviewing processes to identify potential hazards to flight safety. 
This is accomplished with an Event Review Committee (ERC). The ERC may share and 
exchange information and identify actual or potential safety problems from the 
information contained in the reports. The ERC is usually comprised of a management 
representative from the certificate holder, a representative from the employee labor 
association (if applicable), and a specially qualified FAA inspector (FAA, 2002). Its 
principal function has been to conduct scheduled meetings to evaluate each ASAP report 
on a case-by-case basis. The ERC must achieve consensus on every event. The methods 
that the ERC utilize to determine whether to include or exclude an ASAP report is 
detailed in Figure 3. These meetings identify the hazards and assured that every 
corrective action is implemented to mitigate the reported hazard. 
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F/gwre 3. The ASAP Report Flowchart (Adapted from FAA AC 120-66B). 
Similar to other confidential and voluntary safety reporting programs, ASAP 
provides incentives to employees to report safety events and alleged violations. The 
incident must be unintentional and has to be reported in a timely manner (e.g. 24 hours). 
It does not appear to involve an intentional disregard for safety, which involves (a) 
criminal activity, (b) substance abuse, (c) controlled substances, (d) alcohol, and (e) 
intentional falsification. 
The ASAP incident reports have been categorized as sole-source and 
non-sole-source reports. The FAA (2002) has defined a sole-source report as a report in 
which all evidence of the event has been discovered by the single report. Upon 
acceptance into the ASAP database, the participants in a sole-source event would receive 
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either a response from the ASAP ERC or an FAA Letter of No Action, where a 14 CFR 
violation has been identified. No FAA action would be applied if the reports were 
sole-source reports (Farrow, 2010). A non-sole-source report has been defined as a report 
in which the event was not reported by only one of the individual reporting parties. 
Non-sole-source reports involving possible 14 CFR violations have resulted in the FAA 
issuing a Letter of Corrections (FAA, 2002). The reports have usually been archived in a 
database for future references in a two year period. 
Typically, about 70% of the ASAP reports cause a procedural change at the task 
level. For example, task cards or job cards are changed using an existing or a new 
document change process. About 25% of the time, the ASAP reports cause a change 
across the organization. This means the document change process itself might be 
changed, impacting all future document change requests. About 5% of the time, the 
ASAP reports cause an industry-wide change. For example, the report may result in a 
Service Bulletin or an Airworthiness Directive that impacts other organizations (FAA, 
2009). ASAP has proven to be a successful safety program for each individual air carrier. 
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system 
From the birth of proactive safety programs, there has been the assumption that 
information gained from one operator in one program would be integrated with others. 
The result would be a greater understanding of the issues and risks under study (Stolzer, 
Halford, & Goglia, 2008). With the vision for industry wide collaboration and the legal 
protection of information in place, the FAA and the aviation community have initiated a 
safety analysis and data sharing collaboration to proactively analyze broad and extensive 
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data to advance aviation safety, known as the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and 
Sharing (ASIAS). 
The initiative leverages internal FAA datasets, airline safety data, publicly 
available data, manufacturers' data and other data. The airline safety data is being 
safeguarded by the MITRE Corporation, in a de-identified manner to foster broad 
participation and engagement (CAST, n.d.). The contractor, known as the MITRE 
Corporation, serves as a neutral third party to perform the data collection and analysis 
processes. ASIAS fuses various aviation data sources in order to proactively identify 
safety trends and to assess the impact of changes in the aviation operating environment. It 
is designed to address the following issues in the past: (a) fragmentation of safety data 
and information, (b) difficult access problems, (c) lack of data standards, (d) data quality 
deficiencies, (e) lack of analytical tools and methodologies, and (f) need to develop 
diagnostic and prognostic analytical (Pardee, 2008). The two components of this activity 
are the Analysis of aggregate data and the Sharing of information. 
The resources of ASIAS include both public and non-public aviation data. Public 
data sources include, but are not limited to, air traffic management data related to traffic, 
weather, and procedures. Non-public sources include de-identified data from aircraft 
operators, including digital flight data and safety reports submitted by flight crews. 
Future plans include the addition of de-identified reports from maintenance and dispatch 
personnel, flight attendants, and air traffic controllers. Governance agreements with 
participating operators and owners of specific databases provide ASIAS analysts with 
access to safety data without having to archive sensitive proprietary information centrally 
(CAST, n.d.). 
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ASIAS has been developed and collaborated with 13 major air carriers, such as 
American, Delta, and Continental. It establishes key safety benchmarks so that individual 
operators may assess their own safety performance against the industry as a whole. A 
partnership between the industry and the regulator is also established, which is the Civil 
Aviation Safety Team (CAST). The CAST and ASIAS are closely cooperating with each 
other to implement the preventive or corrective actions in the industry from the results of 
those analyses (CAST, n.d.). With the efforts of ASIAS and CAST, an industry-wide 
consensus is built to support the Safety Management System (SMS). 
Safety Management System (SMS) 
SMS is an organized approach to managing safety, including the necessary 
organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures. ICAO's Standards 
and Recommended Practices require that States establish a "safety program" to achieve 
an acceptable level of safety in aviation operations. The acceptable level of safety shall 
be established by the State(s) concerned (ICAO, 2006). 1CAO initiated provisions of the 
Safety Management System (SMS) in November, 2006. Air carriers, airdrome operators, 
and maintenance organizations around the world are required to implement SMS (Galotti, 
Rao, & Maurino, 2006). 
The performance-based approaches to the management of safety have been 
demonstrated by SMS. The brief definition of SMS can be described as "a dynamic risk 
management system based on quality management system (QMS) principles in a 
structure scaled appropriately to the operational risk, applied in a safety culture 
environment" (Stolzer et al., 2008, p. 18-19). Any SMS-type system has also been 
regarded as a dynamic risk management system. Using the Risk Matrix, shown in Figure 
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4, the approach allows the employees and management to consider the risks of not 
implementing a particular safety intervention — the cost of the intervention could be 
measured against the cost of the event (the likelihood of occurrence of the event and the 
severity of the event). The assessment provides a guideline for mitigating actions and 
allowable timelines for corrective and preventive actions (Stolzer et al., 2008). The 
organization is able to allocate its resources to eliminate the highest risk index first. 
Through this process, risks can be managed within an acceptable parameter in the most 
cost effective way. 
Figure 4 Risk Matrix (Adapted from Stolzer et al., 2008) 
In FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 120-92, the SMS is structured upon four basic 
components of safety management: (a) safety policy, (b) safety risk management (SRM), 
(c) safety assurance, and (d) safety promotion (FAA, 2006). Thus, an SMS is functioning 
effectively when all four structural elements exist and are being executed. The four 
principles are also known as "Four Pillars" in FAA AC 120-92. Figure 5 shows how the 
Four Pillars act as the foundation of SMS and support the success of a SMS. With the 
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Four Pillars, an SMS can be applied in building a healthy safety culture (Stolzer et al., 
2008). 
Figure 5. Four Pillars of SMS. (Adapted from Stolzer et al., 2008) 
Safety Policy 
An SMS must first define its policies, procedures, and organizational structures, 
which describe responsibility, authority, accountability, and expectations (Stolzer et al, 
2008). Under the broad umbrella of the SMS program, the aviation organization could 
make a commitment to the employees across the company that the voluntary safety 
reporting will be carefully considered using the SRM approach and appropriate feedback 
will be provided to all reports. Organizational safety culture will be assessed regularly 
and specific improvement efforts will be implemented; employee and management 
evaluation and reward systems will incorporate adequate support for SMS (FAA, 2009). 
The main idea is that in companies where management is truly committed to 
enhancing safety as a core business activity, employees will not be afraid of pointing out 
their safety deficiencies. This requires a change in the way that people think about safety 
It is often referred to as a collective perception and culture. Although culture cannot be 
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regulated or implemented in the way that more concrete systems and regulations may be, 
management philosophy can be conveyed by unambiguous terms throughout an 
organization (Galotti et al., 2006). With the safety policy in place, it would create an 
environment which favors the improvement of safety. 
Safety Risk Management (SRM) 
A formal system of hazard identification and SRM is essential in controlling risk 
to acceptable levels. The SRM component of the SMS is based upon the system safety 
process model (FAA, 2008). The SRM process provides objective means of assessing 
safety risks. It is the core function of SMS, which is to identify and control hazards. This 
process could be incorporated in the voluntary safety reporting programs so that all 
recommendations coming from the incident reports consider the risk aspects, severity and 
likelihood, prior to making recommendations. Subsequently, if the recommendation for a 
particular change is not accepted by the company management, a corresponding SRM 
rationale could be provided by the management. 
Figure 6 shows the basic flow of information through an SMS Risk Control 
Process, which explains the task loop to control risks in detail. The process and 
information flow is designed to identify latent or unrecognized unsafe conditions and 
analyze them for impact on the organization so that actions can be taken to adequately 
control those conditions. Most importantly, this SRM process requires information to be 
obtained from all kinds of sources, such as audits and voluntary safety programs. In order 
to assess and manage risks, it is essential for SMS to collect data and go through the SRM 
process continuously. 
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Figure 6 Risk Control Process of SMS. (Adapted from Stolzer et al, 2008) 
Safety Assurance 
Once SRM is implemented, the operator must ensure it is continuously practiced 
and continue to be effective in a changing environment. The safety assurance function 
provides for this using quality management concepts and processes. The safety risk 
management and safety assurance processes are integrated in the SMS. The safety risk 
management process provides for initial identification of hazards and assessment of risk. 
Organizational risk controls are developed and, once they are determined to be capable of 
bringing the risk to an acceptable level, they are employed operationally. The safety 
assurance function takes over at this point to ensure that the risk controls are being 
practiced and they continue to achieve their intended objectives. This system also 
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provides for assessment of the need for new controls because of changes in the 
operational environment (FAA, 2008). Tracking the changes accomplished as a direct 
result of those voluntary safety programs would be the best way to meet this SMS 
requirement. Such actions should document the evidence of organizational change as well 
as emphasis on systematic solutions and the shift toward a safety culture (FAA, 2009). 
Safety Promotion 
The safety promotion pillar has had as an objective to create a safety culture, 
which would begin at the top of the organization with the incorporation of policies and 
procedures that could cultivate a reporting culture and a Just Culture. To support a 
reporting culture, the organization must cultivate the willingness of its employees to 
contribute to the organization's understanding of its operation. Since the most valuable 
reports have evolved to self-disclosure of mistakes, the organization must make the 
commitment to act in a non-punitive manner when those mistakes were not the result of 
careless or reckless behavior. An SMS can provide a company with mechanisms for 
allowing employees to submit reports on safety deficiencies without fear of reprisal. It 
should also generate robust mechanisms to disseminate information to its workforce. As a 
result, each employee could have timely access to safety-related information, since the 
data would have no value unless an organization could learn from it in time to avoid a 
mistake. An SMS should be a closed-loop system, in which an audit trail can exist 
whereby a discovery in the risk assessment and analysis process may lead to causal 
analysis that would be used in a preventive and corrective action process to modify the 
operations and reduce risks (Stolzer, et al., 2008). 
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Implementation 
SMS has not only been assisting the FAA in maintaining the voluntary reporting 
programs that have been operated effectively and efficiently in the U.S., but have also 
been conducted in other countries. Transport Canada committed to the implementation of 
the SMS in aviation organizations in 2005. Europe and New Zealand have moved 
forward with the SMS more quickly than the U.S. (Stolzer et al., 2008). Taiwan also has 
mandated Taiwanese air carriers to implement the SMS as of January 1, 2009 (CAA, AC 
120-32B, 2007). Although Taiwanese aviation authorities have put the SMS into practice, 
one of its fundamental elements, safety culture, has experienced difficulty for acceptance 
of the program in the Taiwan aviation industry due to the nature of the national culture. 
The question now is how to get the maintenance organizations in Taiwan to comply with 
ICAO's requirement for safety programs. 
Safety Culture 
Culture is defined as the values, belief, and norms shared of a group of people that 
influence the way they behave (FAA, 2008). Human beings are all influenced by cultural 
issues. The various cultures set boundaries for acceptable behavior and provide a 
framework for decision making. A safety culture is the "engine" that continues to drive 
the organization towards the goal of maximum attainable safety. It can be divided into 
two parts. The first comprises the beliefs, attitude, and values (often unspoken) of an 
organization's membership regarding the pursuit of safety. The second is concrete and 
embraces the structures, practices, controls, and policies that an organization possesses 
and employs to achieve greater safety (Reason & Hobbs, 2003). Safety culture is 
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regarded as a fusion of the following elements: 
1. Just Culture: A concept that people are encouraged, and even rewarded, for 
providing essential safety-related information. There is a clear line that 
differentiates between acceptable and unacceptable behavior (Stolzer et al., 
2008). 
2. Reporting Culture: Aims to create a comfortable environment for people to 
acknowledge any safety deficiency in the organization. The information 
would be de-identified and protected by separated authority. People are* 
prepared and easy to report their errors and experiences (Reason & Hobbs, 
2003). 
3. Learning Culture: Is used to guide continuous and wide-reaching system 
improvements rather than mere local fixes. Under learning culture, people 
have the willingness and the competence to draw conclusions from safety 
information systems and the will to implement major reforms (Reason & 
Hobbs, 2003). 
These subcomponents of a safety culture (a Just Culture, a reporting culture, and a 
learning culture) would need to work together to create an informed culture, which in 
most respects, has been regarded as a key element to a safety culture (Stolzer et al., 
2008). It lets everybody have the knowledge about the human, technical, organizational 
and environmental factors that determine the safety of the system as a whole. People 
would know where the "edge" is without having to fall over it. 
Organizational psychologists tell us that there are three distinct cultural 
environments that we need to understand: (a) national culture encompasses the value of 
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particular nations, (b) organizational/corporate culture differentiates the behavior found 
in various organizations, and (c) professional behavior differentiates the behavior found 
in different professional groups (Stolzer et al., 2008). 
Voluntary safety programs are generally impeded by many difficulties, such as 
trustiness of confidentiality, punishment, and personal identity, etc. Establishing a safety 
culture in the organization is essential for safety improvements. If people do not trust the 
organization that is operating the reporting system, the systems will not succeed. As the 
China Airlines Flight 611 case shows, Taiwan's aviation industry strongly addressed the 
punishment and blame culture. Because of the traditions in Chinese culture, it is hard to 
establish a Just Culture, the most important foundation in safety culture (Stolzer et al., 
2008). 
Social Culture 
China is one of the oldest civilizations in mankind's history. In Chinese history, 
people lived in union and were governed by emperors. Even though there have not been 
emperors in China during the past 100 years, certain perspectives of Chinese culture 
persist (Lee & Weitzel, 2005). The dimensions of social culture were first defined by 
Gerard Hendrik Hofstede (1978). His study demonstrates that there are national and 
regional cultural groupings that affect the behavior of societies and organizations. Mainly, 
there are four dimensions of culture differences, which include (a) power distance (PD), 
(b) individualism-collectivism (IC), (c) uncertainty avoidance (UA), and (d) masculinity. 
PD is defined as how the less powerful members of institutions and organizations 
expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. Low PD accepts power relations 
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that are more consultative or democratic. People relate to one another more as equals 
regardless of formal positions. Subordinates are more comfortable with and demand the 
right to contribute to and critique the decision making of those in power. On the contrary, 
high PD means less powerful accept power relations that are more autocratic and 
paternalistic. Subordinates acknowledge the power of others simply based on where they 
are situated in certain formal, hierarchical positions (Hofstede, 2001). As a result, the low 
or high PD alters the chain of command in an organization. In high PD, superiors have 
the full authority and may become "error-free." Inadequate decision making and "no 
questions asked" philosophy could end up with a disaster. In low PD, people tend to 
become reckless about superiors' instructions. 
In Chinese culture, there is a high PD. Authoritarianism is a characteristic based 
on 5,000 years of dictatorship. It has a large amount of influence within society. Figures 
of authority, such as professors, managers, and airline captains, are treated with a great 
amount of respect by their subordinates. Chinese subordinates treat their superiors with 
high respect, regardless of the environment and conditions. This relationship between 
superiors and subordinates routinely exists beyond the working environment. An example 
is that eye contact with figures of authorities is acceptable and is encouraged for 
subordinates in the Western cultures. In contrast, Chinese cultures consider that a 
subordinate making an eye contact with a figure of authority is disrespectful; therefore, 
the action is strongly discouraged and avoided. In addition, there has been a common 
belief that a figure of authority is error-free. This belief has led figures of authorities not 
to allow challenges or questions. Superiors will not admit their errors, and the primary 
result is that they might have fear of losing jobs. As a result, the responsibility of the 
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subordinate is to preserve the superiors' face, which is regarded as one's dignity and 
prestige, thereby maintaining the harmony of the group (Lee & Weitzel, 2005). 
As for IC, individualism is contrasted with collectivism, and refers to the extent to 
which people are expected to stand up for themselves and to choose their own 
affiliations, or alternatively act predominantly as a member of a group or organization. 
Asian and Latin American cultures rank among the most collectivist in this category, 
while Anglo countries such as the United States, Great Britain and Australia are the most 
individualistic cultures (Hofstede, 2001). People in an individualist culture may becDme 
over-confident of themselves and take risky actions. On the other hand, people in a 
collectivist culture rarely express their individual opinions during social activities, such 
as conferences and lectures. This may become a latent risk in aviation safety when people 
fail to report a problem (Lee & Weitzel, 2005). 
Chinese culture is characterized by its strong emphasis on collectivism, and the 
principle of individualism in most western cultures dislikes that in the Chinese culture. In 
general, Chinese consider the implications of their behavior in a framework of concern 
extending beyond their immediate family. Thus, people in a collectivist culture often 
behave in relation to their family or organization. As a result, this characteristic of 
Chinese culture has led Chinese children to be taught to listen and not to speak at a young 
age and speak only when spoken to. Nevertheless, human society is formed as a group 
and can function well, but it relies heavily on individual performance. One of the main 
components to maintain the function of the society is the harmony of the group, which is 
usually the priority concern. Therefore, they are not dependent upon themselves, but the 
society. This may become a latent risk in aviation safety (Lee & Weitzel, 2005). 
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UA reflects the extent to which members of a society attempt to cope with anxiety 
by minimizing uncertainty. Cultures that scored high in UA prefer rules (e.g. about 
religion and food) and structured circumstances, and employees tend to remain longer 
with their present employer. Mediterranean cultures, Latin America, and Japan rank the 
highest in this category (Hofstede, 2001). Therefore, these uncertainties often cause 
misunderstandings between people, and may lead to miscommunication and lack of 
communication at work. 
The social pressure in Chinese culture leads to UA and also evolves into a 
"shame" culture. The Chinese are more sensitive to pressure from society rather than an 
individual's internal pressure and feelings. The society is heavily ruled and structured in 
both written and unwritten ways. In contrast, many other cultures emphasize honor 
systems or codes of honor. The measurements are commonly based on one's feelings of 
guilt and have to be conducted in accordance with one's own judgment. The honor 
system, however, cannot be applied to the Chinese culture. As a result, most Chinese 
grow up and are affected by social pressure. In general, the honor system in Chinese is 
determined by one's belief system (Lee & Weitzel, 2005). 
Masculinity versus its opposite, femininity, refers to the distribution of roles 
between the genders which is another fundamental issue for any society to which a range 
of solutions are found. Masculine cultures value competitiveness, assertiveness, ambition, 
and the accumulation of wealth and material possessions, whereas feminine cultures 
place more value on relationships and quality of life (Hofstede, 2001). Due to the 
difference on valuing daily life, this characteristic in the culture may lead a person to 
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become aggressive or passive at work. Consequently, that may result in a lack of 
assertiveness, leadership, and situational awareness. 
Based on 5,000 years of empire history, males usually rule the society, and 
females are less empowered. The rights for males and females are imbalanced. Although 
the situation has changed dramatically since democracy was introduced, males are still 
more career motivated than females. That affects their jobs, especially in the aviation 
industry, which is considered a highly technical field. 
Just Culture 
Voluntary incident reporting usually involves the air carriers, authorities, and 
employees. Getting people to report is about building trust. Trust that the information 
provided in good faith will not be used against those who reported it. Keeping up the 
reporting rate is also about trust, but it is even more about involvement, participation, and 
empowerment (Dekker, 2007). Therefore, a Just Culture needs to be established within an 
organization in order to set a comfortable climate (confidential and non-punitive cultures) 
for the voluntary incident reporting program. 
The foundation of the Four Pillars of SMS, present in all the voluntary safety 
programs, cannot stand without the support of a Just Culture. These programs cannot be 
run effectively without a Just Culture as a basis for establishing a reporting climate. Just 
Culture has promoted an atmosphere of mutual trust that would encourage voluntary 
reporting. When an employee has been motivated to report work errors (other than 
intentional, reckless, or the result of an accident), the organization has benefited from a 
safety point of view. Not all employees have embraced the idea of voluntary reporting. 
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Dekker (2007) pointed out that "the main reason has been that reporting could be risky. 
Many things can be unclear: 
1. How exactly will the supervisor, the manager, the organization respond? 
2. What are the rights and obligations of the reporter? 
3. Will the reported information stay inside of [sic] the organization? Or will other 
parties (media and prosecutor) have access to it? " (p. 41). 
The reporting individual may have no faith that anything meaningful would be 
done with what he or she reported. This issue may be more significant in Asian countries 
with a solid Chinese culture. Therefore, the aviation industry in Taiwan is experiencing 
the hardship of building a Just Culture and transitioning from less willingness for 
reporting to a voluntary safety reporting program. 
Getting people to report has been difficult. Keeping up the reporting rate once the 
system has been instituted is equally challenging. An effective reporting culture depends 
on how the organization can handle blame and punishment. Reason (1997) has defined 
Just Culture as "an atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged, even rewarded, 
for providing essential safety-related information, but in which they are also clear about 
where the line must be drawn between acceptable and unacceptable behavior," (p. 195); 
Just Culture has been the ultimate concept underpinning the maintenance and 
effectiveness of a voluntary reporting system. Just Culture has also been a tool for 
improving safety by knowing how to reconcile accountability for failure with learning 
from that failure - with the aim of continuing to make progress on safety (Dekker, 2007). 
Figure 7 shows that, in Just Culture, it is unacceptable to punish all errors and 
unsafe acts regardless of their origins and circumstances. It is, however, equally 
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unacceptable to give blanket immunity from sanctions for all actions that could contribute 
to organizational accidents/incidents. One of the difficulties of managing the application 
of Just Culture is focused in discriminating between truly "bad behavior," and the vast 
majority of unsafe acts to which the attribution of blame has been neither appropriate nor 
useful (Reason, 1997). 
SMS addresses honest mistakes for the 
single purpose of improving safetv 
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Figure 7. The Concepts of Just Culture (Adapted from Cioponea, 2007, slide 3). 
The Just Culture Community (2006) categorized the four evils of human 
behaviors (human errors, negligent conduct, reckless conduct, and knowing violations) to 
assist the industry in determining whether behaviors can be assigned a degree of risk, or 
not. Nevertheless, it also illustrated that knowing violations may fall into either at-risk or 
reckless behavior based on the individual's perception. Psychological and legal issues 
should be taken into consideration when making the judgment. 
5S 
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Dekker (2007) pointed out that engineering a Just Culture relies upon the 
following three central questions: 
1. Who in the organization or society gets to draw the line between acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior? 
2. What and where should the role of domain expertise be in judging whether 
behavior is acceptable or unacceptable? 
3. How protected against judicial interference are safety data (either the safety 
data from incidents inside of [sic] the organization or the safety data that come 
from formal accident investigation)? (p. 119) 
These questions are difficult to answer definitely, since influences from countries, 
organizations, and professions may lead to multiple avenues of approach toward 
establishing a Just Culture. Although establishing a Just Culture within any voluntary 
safety programs might have difficulties and depend upon differences of national culture, 
Just Culture appears to some as two separate concepts - "Justice" and "Culture." 
Although the concepts of justice and culture have basically been fixed and are not 
malleable, a relationship between them could be fashioned to meet any particular needed 
mindset. Dekker (2007) introduced four steps regarding how to build a Just Culture. 
These steps illustrated in Figure 8 demonstrate how airlines and aviation authorities can 
implement Just Culture to establish a level of trust that would be necessary to enhance the 
effectiveness of voluntary safety reporting programs. The ultimate goal of adopting Just 
Culture in many Eastern countries could eliminate cultural discrepancies and its 
influences. 
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.. Protect your organization's 
data from outside probing 
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Figure 8. Approaches to Build a Just Culture (Adapted from Dekker, 2007, p. 138). 
The fourth step (agree on who draws the line in each country), utilized for 
establishing an effective safety reporting program/system, however, needs to be 
implemented by agreement between the aviation authority, the airline, and the union. 
Since most Asian countries such as Taiwan do not have regulations addressing immunity, 
the fear of disciplinary actions from the governmental authority and from the airline may 
reduce the employees' trust in a safety reporting program and his/her willingness to 
participation in reporting. Without the immunity agreement, building a thoroughly Just 
Culture cannot be achieved. 
The importance of securing the free flow of information to determine the cause of 
incidents affects the prevention of future accidents and incidents. What people should 
focus on is determining contributing factors and producing preventive methods, instead 
of a criminal punishment to employees. 
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Maintenance Resource Management 
Following Crew Resource Management (CRM), the first generation of 
Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) was developed in 1989 after the Aloha 
Airlines accident (Patankar & Taylor, 2004b). MRM is a general process for improving 
communication, effectiveness and safety in aircraft maintenance operations. As much as 
CRM was created to address safety and teamwork issues in the cockpit, the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), in conjunction with industry partners, developed MRM 
to address teamwork deficiencies within the aviation maintenance environment (FAA, 
2000). 
MRM is often referred to as a training program, but MRM is much more than 
training. It is a tool to provide individuals and groups with the skills and processes to 
manage errors that are within their control, such as communication, decision-making, 
situation awareness, workload management, and team building. Part of MRM is training, 
but part of it must be the application and management of the attitude, skills, and 
knowledge that training and behavior can provide (Patankar & Taylor, 2004b). 
Today, the fourth generation of MRM programs have taken root. It is 
characterized by a commitment to long-term communication and behavioral change in 
maintenance. The emergence of MRM should be more than awareness training or coping 
skills. It is the conscious process of increasing trust among maintainers, their managers, 
and their regulators that enable them to learn from present behaviors in order to improve 
quality and efficiency. It is the process of cultural change (Patankar & Taylor, 2004b). 
The fourth generation MRM programs are being designed and implemented from 
a systematic perspective. The airline operators are aware of the interpersonal trust issues 
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that impede self-disclosure, and they are striving to incorporate a Maintenance Error 
Investigation module in their training so that the participants understand the procedure of 
such investigation (Patankar & Taylor, 2004b). In other words, today's MRM has applied 
incident reports as part of training material. To reduce maintenance errors, an air carrier 
must have a safety program similar to the ASRS and ASAP to gain more knowledge from 
voluntary incident reports while MRM is being implemented into the maintenance 
organization. 
Taiwanese Civil Aviation Authorities 
In Taiwan, the civil aviation authorities are almost equivalent to the authorities in 
the U.S. The Taiwanese Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) is the regulatory and 
administration agency, which is the same as the FAA. Regulations and documentation 
also follow the same safety standards compared to the U.S. The CAA also has a 
mandatory reporting system for aviation occurrences. Meanwhile, the Aviation Safety 
Council (ASC) serves as an independent investigation agency which is similar to the 
functions of NTSB. It provides a voluntary incident reporting program, known as the 
TACARE system. 
Civil Aeronautics Administration 
The Civil Aviation Act in Taiwan was passed on May 30, 1953. This Act was 
enacted to ensure aviation safety, a sound civil aviation system, compliance with 
international civil aviation standards, and promote the development of civil aviation 
(CAA, 2009). Following the guideline from the Organization Act, the Civil Aeronautics 
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Administration (CAA) was established under the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communications (MOTC) to administer affairs relating to civil aviation. 
The Taiwanese CAA has the same functions as the FAA, which are promoting 
and regulating civil aviation. The mission statement of the CAA illustrates three 
objectives: (a) meet the travel and transport demand of the public, (b) promote the 
development of aviation industry, and (c) build an environment of co-existence and 
co-prosperity. The actions toward these missions are (a) implementing flight safety 
systems, (b) expanding civil aviation activities, (c) promoting airport construction,'(d) 
enhancing service quality, and (e) fostering civil aviation elites (CAA, 2009). 
To insure the airworthiness of the aircraft, the CAA provides mandatory oversight 
function in aircraft maintenance, which includes the rules governing (a) classification of 
ratings, (b) inspection procedures manuals, (c) maintenance records, (d) maintenance 
facilities, (e) equipment, (f) parts and qualification of personnel, (g) the establishment of 
maintenance and quality assurance systems, and (h) application for certification, revision 
of ratings, issuance, cancellation and renewal. To comply with the Civil Aviation 
Regulations, the owner or operator of an aircraft with an airworthiness certificate shall 
maintain the aircraft in accordance to regulations. A repair station that performs the 
maintenance applies to the CAA for certification, and then a certificate will be issued 
upon certification. The CAA shall send its personnel to inspect the repair station with 
regard to personnel, facilities and operations. Those being inspected shall not refuse, 
avoid or obstruct such inspections. If the maintenance status does not meet airworthiness 
and safety requirements, the aircraft shall be grounded and its airworthiness certificate be 
revoked (CAA, 2009). 
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In addition to the regulatory certification and inspection, similar to other countries, 
the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) in Taiwan has a mandatory flight 
occurrence reporting system. Most information received by the system fall into the 
category of serious aviation occurrences. 
Aviation Safety Council 
On February 16, 1998, China Airlines flight 676, an Airbus A300-600R crashed 
while conducting a go-around from Runway 5L at Taipei/Taiwan Taoyuan (previously 
Chang Kai-Shek) International Airport (CAA, 2000). Following that accident, the ASC 
was established in May 1998 to be an independent government agency in aviation 
accident investigation, with the purpose of analyzing causal factors and proposing flight 
safety recommendations. 
Based on Taiwan's Civil Aviation Regulation, Articles 84 and 87, the birth of 
ASC was officially declared on May 25, 1998 as an independent council, reporting 
directly to the Premier's office. ASC perform its duties by making findings as to the 
causes and contributing factors through rigorous and systematic air accident 
investigations, and then propose safety recommendations. The Aviation Occurrence 
Investigation Act was also proposed and implemented to address the rules of accident 
investigation. The sole objective of the accident investigations is to improve Taiwan's 
aviation safety, instead of apportioning blame or responsibilities, which is in full 
compliance with 1CAO Annex 13 (ASC, n.d.b). 
ASC consists of seven board members, including a chairman, whom are all 
appointed by the Premier. Regular meetings take place once a month, and additional ones 
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can be called upon by the chairman when deemed necessary. The main structure of ASC 
is comprised of the (a) Occurrence Investigation Division, (b) Flight Safety Division, (c) 
Investigation Laboratory, and (d) Legal and Administrative Division. The Managing 
Director is assigned by the chairman and takes full responsibility for the office operations 
(ASC, n.d.b). The organization chart is shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. The Organization Chart of ASC. (Adapted from ASC, n.d.b) 
One of the key function of the ASC lies in the flight safety division. It conducts 
research regarding aviation occurrence prevention and safety recommendation 
implementation, including the following: (a) established flight safety data base for safety 
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trend analysis, (b) safety recommendations implementation, (c) safety research, (d) 
TAiwan Confidential Aviation safety REporting (TACARE) system, (e) establishing, 
maintaining and developing of the information system, and (f) promote ASC. 
TAiwan Confidential Aviation Safety REporting 
In June 1999, the feasibility study of the reporting system in Taiwan was 
conducted by Nation Cheng Kung University. Based on the recommendations of the 
study, a system with the concept of voluntary, confidential, and non-punitive that • 
provides a channel to collect aviation safety information was launched in the same year 
by the flight safety division in ASC. Safety information gained through reports will be 
published via TACARE Newsletters. Since the system was established, 17 
recommendations concluded from significant reports have been provided to the CAA for 
further improvement (TACARE, n.d.) 
In TACARE's introduction (n.d.), it states: 
To encourage the reporting of actual or potential threats involving the safety of 
aviation operations, TACARE invites flight crew, maintenance personnel, air 
traffic controllers, flight attendants, or any other person to report to the system. 
TACARE provides an independent reporting channel for all personnel in the 
aviation community based on the concept of being "confidential, voluntary and 
non-punitive. Under such ideology, TACARE hopes to elevate Taiwan's aviation 
safety by obtaining, distributing and analyzing safety-related reports, and keeping 
the identity of the reporter confidential at all times. (1)2) 
TACARE has provided five channels for users to submit a report: phone, fax, 
email, website, and traditional mail. The users can report any concern, event, and unsafe 
conditions to TACARE, unless that information would be related to accidents, serious 
incidents (aviation occurrence), and criminal offenses, which should be filed directly to 
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the ASC, the CAA, and the law enforcement agency. Upon receiving reports, the 
TACARE working group would follow the processes shown in Figure 10. The 
de-identification process would be conducted within 72 hours after the contents of the 
report have been confirmed. Thereby, the confidentiality and anonymity of the reporters 
and the parties involved can be ensured (TACARE, n.d.). 
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Figure 10. The Processes of TACARE (Adapted from TACARE. n.d.). 
Once the report has been received and de-identified, the analysts would start 
categorizing and analyzing the information. If the reported information can be considered 
significant enough to improve flight safety, it would be forwarded to the CAA and 
operators in a de-identified form. The information would also be provided to the public 
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through the Newsletters (similar to CALLBACK in NASA ASRS) and the TACARE 
website (TACARE, n.d.). 
Each working group member has signed the Non-disclosure Agreement 
(TACARE, n.d.). Nevertheless, the Non-disclosure Agreement has not been stated in the 
Taiwanese Aviation Regulation; thus, the level of TACARE's confidentiality has been 
questioned. Although there has been no breach of confidentiality and punishment against 
the reporter since TACARE has been established, the ASC has determined that 
TACARE's immunity policy has been an issue of system operations. Even though the 
ASC has dedicated itself to improving the effectiveness of the TACARE, to date, there 
are only three incident reports from ground services personnel and no reports from 
maintenance personnel. Compared to ASRS and ASAP in the U.S., the TACARE system 
is insufficient to reduce the maintenance errors and improve aircraft safety. 
Research Questions 
The review of the literature associated with the TACARE problem resulted in 
three research questions: 
1. "What is the understanding of safety for maintenance personnel in Taiwan"? 
2. "How would the Taiwanese maintenance personnel accept the concept of 
voluntary safety reporting program"? 
3. "How does a U.S. voluntary safety program for aircraft maintenance operations 
implement into Asian culture"? 
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Chapter III 
METHODOLOGY 
Very little research has been conducted to study the safety of aircraft maintenance 
in Taiwan recently. Since the perspectives of maintenance personnel toward TACARE 
were unknown previously, this research used a mixed method design to obtain that data. 
The data collection instruments were developed by the researcher and targeted both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods. This design provided quantifiable results 
and added validity to the research questions. 
A questionnaire and a set of interview topics were designed and administrated to 
evaluate the effectiveness and acceptance of voluntary incident reporting programs for 
maintenance personnel in Taiwan. Safety and voluntary reporting are sensitive issues, 
thus all the personal information from interviewees and survey takers were de-identified. 
The interviews and surveys remained confidential, and none of the participants' personal 
information was revealed in public. 
Mixed Method 
The mixed method research designs combined both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches by mixing the data from both of their data in a single study (Gay, Mills, & 
Airasian, 2006). By interpreting the data from quantitative and qualitative research 
methods, researchers are able to have a broader view of the research and then verify the 
outcomes. The utilization of mixed methods has increased in recent years, but the method 
is still considered new in research design. Since mixed methods produce high validity of 
the collected data, there are more applications in different research fields, especially in 
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aviation, which requires highly accurate results. 
There are a number of different strategies for mixed methods. Creswell (2003) 
classifies them in six main categories: (a) sequential explanatory strategy, (b) sequential 
exploratory strategy, (c) sequential transformative strategy, (d) concurrent triangulation 
strategy, (e) concurrent nested strategy, and (f) concurrent transformative strategy. 
Because of the nature of unknown outcomes in this research, the instruments in this study 
utilized a sequential explanatory strategy. Quantitative data were collected and analyzed 
first. Based on the results of quantitative data, the qualitative method was conducted to 
gather more detailed information. This strategy gathered information from perspectives at 
different levels. 
A sequential explanatory model is identified by its use of one data collecting 
process. It is considered the most straightforward among those mixed method approaches. 
As Figure 11 shows, the procedures of qualitative and quantitative designs are working 
sequentially. It is characterized by the collection and analysis of quantitative data 
followed by the collection and analysis of qualitative data. The two methods are 
integrated during the interpretation phase of the study. 
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Figure 11. Sequential Explanatory Strategy (Adapted from Creswell, 2003) 
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The purpose of the sequential explanatory strategy typically is to use qualitative 
results to assist in explaining and interpreting the findings of primarily quantitative 
research. It can be especially helpful when unexpected results arise from quantitative data. 
The qualitative data can be used to examine these surprising results in more detail. The 
strategy is also easy to implement because the steps fall into clear and separated stages. 
The design feature makes it easy to describe and report (Creswell, 2003). Based on the 
strengths of the sequential explanatory strategy, this study starts with quantitative 
research through general surveys and follows with qualitative research through individual 
interviews. 
The Survey 
The quantitative research with surveys was performed through a random sampling 
from the entire population of Taiwanese maintenance personnel from (a) maintenance 
and engineering departments in the airlines; (b) Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul 
(MRO) facilities; and (c) ground services companies. The 4-page survey consisted of a 
cover letter and 24 questions, 15 multiple choice, and 9 Likert-type-scale questions. The 
cover letter included (a) a basic introduction about the research, (b) the terms and 
conditions of this research, and (c) the contact information of the researcher. The English 
version of the survey is shown in Appendix A. 
The first section of the survey instrument (Questions 1-2) included inquiries 
related to the knowledge of voluntary safety reporting programs and the term - Just 
Culture. Question 1 was designed to examine maintainers' familiarity and utilization of 
the voluntary safety programs in the U.S. and worldwide. Question 2 and 2A were 
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designed to study whether the maintainers in Taiwan have knowledge of Just Culture. 
The second section of the survey (Questions 3-6) were comprised of inquiries 
about the TACARE system. Question 3 was designed to examine maintainers' familiarity 
with TACARE. Questions 4 and 5 were designed to study the utilization of TACARE on 
the part of mechanics and their reasons why they would choose not to utilize TACARE. 
Question 6 was designed to measure the maintainers' beliefs regarding the responsibility 
of TACARE. 
The third section of the survey instrument (Questions 6 through 14) were 
comprised of 9 statements, upon which participants could express their opinions by 
choosing the appropriate answers from the 4-point Likert-type-scale. These questions 
were designed to examine the maintainers' acceptance of those concepts underlying 
voluntary safety reporting programs. The responses to these questions were subsequently 
utilized to evaluate the factors that influence the effectiveness of the TACARE program. 
The most important characteristic of this section was the 4- point Likert-type-scale. The 
Likert scale is generally developed as a 5-point scale and has been popular in many 
research studies. Because of the tendency to not choose sides in Chinese culture, the 
neutral choice may compromise this study. As a result, the 4-point Likert-type-scale was 
deemed more desirable in that it eliminated the neutral choice and forced either an 
agreement or a disagreement with the statement. 
The last section of the survey (Questions 16-24) had 10 demographic Questions. 
Questions 16 to 19 included gender, nationality, age, and experience. Questions 20 and 
21 were about the respondents' primary training source and certificates. Questions 22 and 
23 determined the position of the individual maintainer in the organization. Question 24 
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was an inquiry about whether the participant is willing to receive an electronic copy of 
the result. The background of the participants played an important role in exploring the 
possibility of their acceptance of the TACARE system. These 10 Questions were utilized 
to discover the different influences in the population. The survey was designed to be 
completed in 10 minutes, with a blank space provided for participants to add comments. 
The Interview 
The qualitative research with interviews was conducted after the initial analysis of 
those returned surveys. The interviews were designed to be a case study of one 
maintenance organization in Taiwan. They were conducted to obtain more in-depth 
information from the selected participants building upon the survey questions. A list of 
semi-structured questionnaires was established as a basic outline for interviews. Other 
participants' comments besides the questions were also included. Since the participants 
were all based in Taiwan, the interviews were performed verbally via international phone 
calls and the internet communication software - Skype. Interviewees included certified 
mechanics, experienced supervisors, and managers in the MRO facility in Taiwan. The 
interviewees were selected from convenience samples. All of the personal information 
remained confidential in this research. 
A brief set of semi-structured interview questions was intended to produce 
qualitative responses from them. All questions were framed in the open-ended format to 
obtain the greatest amount of information. Questions 1 and 2 were designed to gather 
information related to the incentives and other factors that contributed to the participants' 
willingness or ultimate decision to utilize the TACARE system. Question 1 inquired 
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about interviewees' knowledge of the TACARE system. Question 2 inquired into the 
participants' opinions regarding the influences of the TACARE system and the safety 
culture among maintenance personnel in Taiwan. Questions 3 and 4 were designed to 
gather information concerning the benefits that the company had gained from the 
company's internal voluntary safety reporting program and the SMS. Question 5 was 
designed to obtain participants' opinions of challenges, advantages, and disadvantages 
related to having a voluntary reporting program. Questions 6 to 8 were utilized to 
examine the existence of Just Culture and to discover what best practices could be 
employed to improve the level of Just Culture and voluntary safety reporting programs. 
Finally, Question 9 was designed to solicit any relevant comment about aircraft 
maintenance safety in Taiwan. 
The 4-page interview instrument included (a) a cover letter with brief 
introduction, (b) interview topics, and (c) demographic inquiries. The instrument was 
designed to optimize each participant's response on all topics. A blank space was 
provided after each question to allow the interviewees and interviewer sufficient area for 
written comments. The interview was designed to be completed within 15 minutes, while 
still giving participants enough time to answer all questions. All interviewees were 
advised by e-mail in advance that all participants would be anonymous, and all responses 
would be de-identified. The English version of the interview instrument was included in 
Appendix C. 
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Instruments Review 
Designs of the English version of the interview and survey instruments were 
completed in January, 2010. Upon completion, the instruments were reviewed and 
approved by the thesis's advisor - Dr. Donald S. Metscher and readers - Dr. James D. 
Ramsay, and Captain Roger A. Mason. Although the interview questions and the survey 
were originally developed in English, it required translation into Chinese for the intended 
participants, as most of them were native Taiwanese. 
The instruments were translated into Chinese not only word-by- word, but also 
using aviation terminology to fit their working vocabulary. The problem of translating the 
English instruments into Chinese was that some aviation terms could not be translated 
into Chinese words directly. Some of the professional terms, such as Just Culture, had no 
single agreed-upon word to express it in Chinese. Therefore, the researcher decided to 
follow the translation of those aviation safety terms, which are used in the publications of 
ASC in Taiwan. 
The Chinese versions of the instruments were completed right after the 
completion of the English versions and then reviewed by Mr. Luke Lu - Chief Executive 
Officer of Formosa Aerospace Corporation, Mr. Chia-Ning Chen - the researcher's father 
and Aviation Journalist of United Daily News, and Mr. Michael Chen - former Master of 
Science in Aeronautics student at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and Project 
Manager in C-Media Electronics, Inc. This procedure was to ensure that participants 
understood the questions clearly and allowed for more accurate answers to the research 
questions. It also ensured the highest possible return rate and completeness of response. 
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Both the English and Chinese versions were ultimately revised in February 3, 2010. The 
Chinese versions of the survey and interview are included in Appendix B and D. 
Administration of the Instrument 
Unlike the U.S., Taiwanese mechanics, supervisors, and managers in aircraft 
maintenance business had been reluctant to voluntarily participate in interview or survey 
studies. Therefore, the researcher expected to encounter significant challenges during the 
actual administration of the instrument. The method to administer the research 
instruments was recommended by Mr. Cha-Ning Chen (researcher's father). Since he had 
deep connections with Taiwanese airline business, his contacts in the Public Relations 
(PR) department of each company were employed to initiate the communication. After 
that, the researcher was able to make contacts with most of the major companies in 
Taiwanese commercial aviation industry. Those companies included (a) China Airlines, 
(b) Taoyuan International Airport Services Co. Ltd. (T1AS), (c) Evergreen Group -
Evergreen Aviation Technologies Corp. (EGAT) and Evergreen Airline Services Corp. 
(EGAS), and (d) TransAsia Airways. Through e-mail communications with the public 
relations departments in those companies, the researcher was able to finalize the content 
of the instruments and the distribution method. 
After the final revision of the survey, it was sent to Mr. Chia-Ning Chen through 
e-mail. Depending on each company's preference, the survey was prepared in both paper 
copies and electronic forms. Following the instructions of each company, the survey 
forms were distributed on February 5, 2010. 
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The interview was designed to gather descriptive data, which could not be fully 
obtained by the surveys. The interview was designed to be conducted after the returns of 
the surveys as a case study of one company. The researcher had decided to perform the 
interviews with participants from EGAT. The interviewees were selected by the 
company's convenience and each individual employee's willingness to contribute further 
in this research, and then the interview questions were emailed to each individual 
interviewee in advance. 
Distribution of the Instrument 
Both language versions of the survey in electronic files were provided to the 
contact person of each company. After their assessments, only the Chinese version of the 
survey was needed. With the approval from the contact person in each company, the 
survey forms were distributed to the associated departments in those companies by Mr. 
Chia-Ning Chen on February 5, 2010. 
A total number of 630 forms were distributed. With the help from Ms. Katherine 
Ko - Manager of PR in Evergreen Group, there were 266 paper forms for both EGAT 
and EGAS. As for China Airlines, with the help of Ms. Amy Sun - Manager of PR and 
Mr. Jerry Wang - Manager of Quality Assurance (QA), there were 200 paper forms and 
another 14 electronic forms distributed in the company's maintenance and engineering 
department. In addition, through personal contacts, there were 100 paper forms for 
TransAsia Airways and 50 for TIAS. The period of the surveys' distribution and 
returning was designed to end on March 5, 2010. 
57 
Based on the information from the initial analysis of those returned surveys, a 
final revision on the semi-structured interview questions was made to adjust the 
measurement toward the understandings of participants. The interview period with the 
participants was started on March 15, 2010, and each interviewee was contacted via 
e-mail by the researcher. There were 9 interviewees in this case study from EGAT. Due 
to the difficulties in communication (e.g., differences in time zone and interviewee's duty 
hours), each interviewee was able to choose to answer the questions in written form via 
e-mail or schedule a convenient time with researcher for telephone interview. 
Treatment of Data 
The data for this thesis were collected to evaluate the safety culture of aircraft 
maintenance in Taiwan, and there were information from interviews and surveys. The 
demographic data both from interviews and surveys were classified to understand 
differences between groups. The answers from interviews were categorized to determine 
the outcomes. The data from the surveys were analyzed and charted using the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), and measured using non parametric inferential 
statistical methods. The quantitative data in the surveys were treated as ordinal data for 
test of significance and correlation. Finally, there was a comparison of outcomes from 
interviews and surveys to assess the final results of this thesis. 
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Chapter IV 
RESULTS 
In this research, there are both quantitative and qualitative data. The distribution 
of the survey (Appendixes A and B) was from February 5 to March 5, 2010. A total of 
630 surveys were administered, and 605 surveys were returned for a participation rate of 
96.03%. Conversely, the interview (Appendixes C and D) was conducted from March 29 
to April 9, 2010, and there were nine interviewees. The results from both are presented 
and discussed in the following section. 
Survey 
The participants of this study were from the aircraft maintenance personnel in 
airlines, MRO facilities, and ground service companies in Taiwan. The participants were 
classified by their airlines or other affiliation with which participants were employed and 
according to their job specifications in the airlines. The participants' companies were (a) 
China Airlines, (b) Taoyuan International Airport Services Co. Ltd. (TIAS), (c) 
Evergreen Group - Evergreen Aviation Technologies Corp. (EGAT) and Evergreen 
Airline Services Corp. (EGAS), and (d) TransAsia Airways. Figure 12 showed that the 
Evergreen Group (EVA) dominated the majority of participants (43.97%). China Airlines 
included 32.40% of the participants. TransAsia Airways and TIAS comprised 16.03% 
and 7.6% of total participants, respectively. 
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Multiple Choice Questions 
The purposes of survey questions 1 through 6 were to obtain participants' attitude 
and knowledge regarding voluntary safety programs. These questions had multiple choice 
answers; thus, the choices of answers were required to be coded for statistical analysis. 
The data were coded as follows: (a) 1 = Option "a", (b) 2 = Option "b", (c) 3 = Option 
*'c". and (d) 4 = Option "d", and continuing in this manner. 
Question 1 was designed to determine the participants' knowledge of the 
voluntary safety programs in the U.S. and worldwide. The participants were able to 
choose any program(s) by simply knowing of the particular program or general 
knowledge of the programs. The results in Table 1 show that 55.5% of participants had 
heard of SMS. Following that, 46.4% of participants had known about ASRS and 
International Air Transportation Association Operational Safety Audit (10SA). Flight 
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Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) was known by 27.1% of participants. ASAP, 
Advanced Qualification Program (AQP), Line Operational Safety Audit (LOSA), 
Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP), and Internal Evaluation Program (IEP) 
collectively were known by less than 15% of participants. 
Table 1 
Familiarization with Voluntary Safety Programs. 
Cases 
Percent 
ASRS 
281 
46.4 
ASAP 
90 
14.9 
FOQA 
164 
27.1 
AQP 
32 
5.3 
LOSA 
69 
11.4 
VDRP 
68 
11.2 
IEP 
52 
8.6 
SMS 
336 
55.5 
lOSA 
281 
46.4 
Question 2 involved the familiarization of the Just Culture (Table 2). There were 
four participants who did not answer this question. A total of 601 participants' responses 
were valid, and only 18.3% had heard about the term Just Culture. 
Table 2 
Just Culture Familiarization. 
Frequency Percent 
Yes n o i l l 
No 491 81.7 
Total 601 100.0 
Missing 4 
Question 2-A presented the level of understanding about the concepts of Just 
Culture. The results are shown in Table 3. Among 110 participants who had heard about 
Just Culture, 80 respondents believed they understood the concepts of Just Culture. 
Therefore, only 13.2% of the total participants were educated concerning Just Culture. 
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Table 3 
Understanding of Just Culture. 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Yes 
No 
Total Respondent 
Total Participant 
80 
30 
110 
605 
13.2 
5.0 
18.2 
100.0 
72.7 
27.3 
100.0 
There were 601 participants out of 605 who answered Question 3. The results in 
Table 4 show that 61.7% of respondents were familiar with TACARE, but they had'never 
utilized it before. Only 3.6% of participants (n = 22) who had known of it and utilized it 
before. There were 33.8% of participants who were not aware of the existence of 
TACARE and another 4.5% of participants (n=27) showed no interests in TACARE. 
Table 4 
TACARE Familiarization. 
Yes, and I have used it 
Yes, but I have not used it 
No, 1 am not aware of TACARE 
No, it is no importance to me 
Total Respondent 
Missing 
Total Participants 
Frequency 
22 
349 
203 
27 
601 
4 
605 
Percent 
3.6 
57.7 
33.6 
4.5 
99.3 
.7 
100.0 
Valid 
Percent 
3.7 
58.1 
33.8 
4.5 
100.0 
Cumulative 
Percent 
3.7 
61.7 
95.5 
100.0 
As illustrated in Table 5, the results of Question 4 show the willingness of 
reporting in Taiwan. More than 90% of participants suggested that it is important to 
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submit reports to the TACARE system and only 9.1% of participants said they would not 
submit reports to TACARE. 
Table 5 
TACARE Participation. 
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
Percent Percent 
Yes 545 90l 908 90.8 
No 55 9.1 9.2 100.0 
Total Respondents 600 99.2 100.0 
Missing 5 .8 
Total Participants 605 100.0 
Question 5 consisted of two parts: 5-A and 5-B. Question 5-A examined 
participants' belief in the responsibility of reporting (Table 6). Among participants 
believing in the importance of TACARE, 73.9% of them believed that it is everyone's 
responsibility to file a report when a safety problem was spotted. Fewer respondents 
(9.6% and 10.1%) indicated that a safety problem can only be reported by supervisor or 
inspector. 
Table 6 
TACARE Reporters (Question 5-A). 
Frequency Percent 
Supervisor 
Mechanic/Operator 
Inspector 
Anyone 
54 9.6 
36 6.4 
57 10.1 
416 73.9 
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Question 5-B inquired into the possible factors that caused participants not to 
submit a safety report to TACARE. There were five statements and one open-ended 
option for participants to choose. The statements were listed as: (a) the probability of 
disciplinary action(s) from my company, (b) the lack of confidence on the immunity of TACARE 
system, (c) my unfamiliarity with the TACARE reporting procedures, (d) I do not believe a 
submission of a TACARE report would not improve flight safety, and (e) the company has its 
own reporting procedure, so TACARE is irrelevant. The participants were allowed to choose 
multiple answers related to their concerns with reporting to TACARE. Figure 13 shows 
the number of respondents for each statement. Statement "c" had the highest count of 143 
respondents, which suggested the lack of knowledge on the reporting procedures. 
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Figure 13. Reasons for not Participating in TACARE (Question 5-B) 
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There were 12 participants who selected the open-ended option and 11 of them 
wrote down their opinions. Table 7 illustrated the statements from those participants. 
Table 7 
Other Reasons for not Participating in TACARE. 
Frequency 
Not applicable 
1 did not see any change from TACARE. 
There are high standards for Quality Control (QC) and inspection in the 
company. 
ASC did not provide just investigation; thus, I do not have confidence on ASC. 
1 did not notice any safety issue. 
I was not aware of TACARE's existence. 
There is not enough protection on the information. 
I did not perform maintenance on aircraft directly. 
Nothing needs to be reported so far. 
The system should mandate all aviation personnel to report. 
When the company's reporting system fail or is unable to remove the hazard, 
TACARE will be used. 
Total 12 
Question 6 inquired into participants' perspectives about which agencies should 
be held accountable for the administration of TACARE. Different parties listed in Table 8 
were presented to the participants, and multiple answers were allowed for participants. 
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The results show that 45.8% of participants believed that CAA should collect the data 
and process them. The ASC was selected by 41.7% of participants. An independent 
organization and each company itself were selected by 31.4% and 26.8% of participants. 
Table 8 
TACARE Accountable Parties 
Cases 
Percent 
CAA 
277 
45.8 
Organization 
190 
31.4 
ASC 
252 
41.7 
Company 
162 
26.8 
Likert-Type-Scale Questionnaires 
The second part of the survey was comprised of 4-point Likert-type-scale 
questions. The main purpose of those agreement questions was to evaluate participants' 
acceptance of the principles related to voluntary safety programs. In accordance with 
normal coding practice, they were coded as: (a) Strongly Agree = 1, (b) Agree = 2, (c) 
Disagree = 3, (d) Strongly Disagree = 4. 
In Table 9, the results of Question 7 show that 47.2% of the respondents strongly 
agreed that a well-organized voluntary and confidential incident reporting system would 
enhance aviation safety. Another 49.3% were in moderate agreement with this statement. 
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Table 9 
Voluntary Reporting System Related to Aviation Safety. 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Strongly Agree 283 47.2 47.2 
Agree 296 49.3 96.5 
Disagree 17 2.8 99.3 
Strongly Disagree 4 .7 100.0 
Total Respondents 600 100.0 
The results of Question 8 are shown in Table 10. Over 50% of respondents 
strongly agreed that the information in incident reports should be de-identified and 
remain anonymous for the public. There was a total of 93.5% of respondents who agreed 
this statement. 
Table 10 
Agreement on Personal Information Protection. 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Strongly Agree 305 50.8 50.8 
Agree 256 42.7 93.5 
Disagree 28 4.7 98.2 
Strongly Disagree 11 1.8 100.0 
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Question 9 discussed the acceptance of team review in the voluntary reporting 
program. The results (Table 11) show that 97.3% of participants consented to the concept 
that incident reports should be reviewed by a team of safety experts and investigators. 
Table 11 
Agreement Regarding Team Review. 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Total Respondents 
262 
321 
12 
600 
43.8 
53.5 
2.0 
.7 
100.0 
43.8 
97.3 
99.3 
100.0 
In Table 12, the results of Question 10 revealed a slightly less agreement than the 
average agreement on those questions. The data indicated that the concept of including an 
employee representative in the report review team was supported by 83.8% of 
participants. 
Table 12 
Participation of Employee Representative. 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Total Respondents 
196 
306 
71 
26 
599 
32.7 
51.1 
11.9 
4.3 
100.0 
32.7 
83.8 
95.7 
100.0 
Question 11 asked the degree of agreement that Just Culture should be introduced 
to safety experts and representatives in team review of the voluntary reporting program. 
The results in Table 13 showed that it was agreed to by 93.1% of participants. 
Table 13 
Acceptance of Just Culture. 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Strongly Agree 168 28.3 28.3 
Agree 385 64.8 93.1 
Disagree 26 4.4 97.5 
Strongly Disagree 15 2.5 100.0 
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Question 12 asked about whether acceptable behaviors (human errors and at-risk 
behaviors) should be protected from disciplinary actions in a Just Culture. Table 14 
shows 88.4% of participants concurred in this concept of Just Culture. 
Table 14 
Protection for Acceptable Behaviors. 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Total Respondents 
Frequency 
214 
310 
57 
12 
593 
Percent 
36.1 
52.3 
9.6 
2.0 
100.0 
Cumulative 
Percent 
36.1 
88.4 
98.0 
100.0 
Question 13 asked about whether unacceptable behaviors (reckless behaviors) 
should not be protected in the voluntary reporting program. Table 15 shows 86.9% of 
participants agreed in this concept of Just Culture. 
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Table 15 
No Immunity for Unacceptable Behaviors. 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Total Respondents 
Frequency 
184 
329 
50 
27 
590 
Percent 
31.2 
55.8 
8.5 
4.6 
100.0 
Cumulative 
Percent 
31.2 
86.9 
95.4 
100.0 
The results of Question 14 shown in Table 16 discovered a slightly lesser 
agreement when compared to average agreement among those questions. There were 
83.6% of participants who agreed and strongly agreed that in their opinion unanimous 
consensus must be reached by all members of the incident review team on events 
reported. 
Table 16 
Agreement on Reaching Unanimous Consensus. 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Strongly Agree 150 25.3 25.3 
Agree 345 58.3 83.6 
Disagree 83 14.0 97.6 
Strongly Disagree 14 2.4 100.0 
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The results of Question 15 show that a great deal of participants (97.3%) agreed 
that the voluntary reporting program should create effective feedbacks to the reporting 
community. The data results are shown in Table 17. 
Table 17 
Effective Feedbacks from Incident Reports. 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Strongly Agree 
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
Total Respondents 
258 
322 
10 
6 
596 
43.3 
54.0 
1.7 
1.0 
100.0 
43.3 
97.3 
99.0 
100.0 
The overall agreement of each participant regarding the concepts of the voluntary 
reporting program was summarized with each individual's agreement level from 
Question 7 to 15. With 9 Likert-type-scale questions, the maximum agreement total sum 
for each participant was (a) Strongly Agree = 1 x 9 = 9, (b) Agree = 2 x 9 = 18, (c) 
Disagree = 3 x 9 = 27, and (d) Strongly Disagree = 4 x 9 =36. The lowest possible 
agreement total sum with strongly agree was 9; the highest possible agreement total sum 
was 36. There were 582 valid cases for calculation. The mean (M) was 15.56, which 
showed the positive trend of agreement on those concepts. The confidence interval was 
set as 95%. The total sums of agreement level are graphed in Figure 19. 
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Figure 14. Total Sums of Agreement Level with Likert-type-scale Questions 
Demographics 
Questions 16 through 24 in the survey were demographic questions. The data 
from Question 16 (Table 18) found that the majority (94.7%) of maintenance personnel in 
Taiwan were male. There were only 32 female participants (5.3%). 
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Table 18 
Gender of Participants. 
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Male 
Female 
Total Respondents 
Missing 
Total Participants 
567 
32 
599 
6 
605 
93.7 
5.3 
99.0 
1.0 
100.0 
94.7 
5.3 
100.0 
The results from Question 17 (Table 19) show that the majority of participants 
(96.7%) were Taiwanese. There were only 3 participants (0.5%) who also had foreign 
citizenship. However, 20 participants (3.3%) did not answer this question. 
Table 19 
Nationality of Participants. 
Taiwanese Foreigner Missing 
Cases 585 3 20 
Percent 96.7 0.5 3.3 
Question 18 asked the age group of each participant (Figure 15). Among the 600 
respondents, most of them (46%) were in the age group from 31 to 40. The second 
highest number of participants (25.83%) was the group from age 41 to 50. The youngest 
age group from 18 to 30 had 16.83% of participants. There were 9.83% of participants in 
the age group from 51 to 60, and there were only 1.5% of participants had an age over 61. 
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Figure 15 Participants' Age Groups 
There were 29 participants that chose not to respond to Question 19. Figure 16 
shows the level of experience for each respondent. The majority of respondents (45.7%) 
had been working in aviation industry from 11 to 20 years. There were 38.4% of 
respondents had less than 10 years of experience in aviation and another 16% had 
experience over 20 years. 
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Figure 16. Groups of Aviation Experience 
Question 20 represented the training sources of participants (Figure 17). Most of 
the participants (n=481) received training from their companies. The second highest 
source for training was the Taiwanese air force (n=S 73). Also, 142 participants received 
aviation related college degrees. However, there were only 69 participants who had 
training from an aircraft maintenance training school. Other sources of training included 
training from (a) manufacturer, (b) other airlines, (c) computer simulation, and (d) the 
government, where there were 12 participants. 
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In Figure 18, the results of Question 21 show that half of the participants (n-305) 
hold the CAA aircraft maintenance certificate. Among the participants, only 79 of them 
hold the ¥ AA Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) certificate. There was one participant who 
held an Aircraft Parts Repair Certificate, and one with a Pratt and Whitnev Powerplant 
certificate. On the other hand, there were 273 participants who did not hold am 
maintenance certificate. 
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Question 22 discussed the different professional fields of participants. The fields 
are listed in Table 20. The majority of participants (87.4%) were mechanics in the fields 
of (a) line maintenance, (b) hangar maintenance, (c) shop maintenance, and (d) ground 
services and ramp operations. There were 22.6% of participants in other functions of a 
maintenance organization. 
Table 20 
Participants' Professional Fields. 
Line Maintenance 
Line and Hangar 
Line, Hangar, and Shop 
Line, Hangar, Shop, and Ramp 
Line, Hangar, and Ramp 
Line and Shop 
Line and Ramp 
Hangar Maintenance 
Hangar and Shop 
Hangar and Ramp 
Shop Maintenance 
Shop and Ramp 
Ramp Operations 
Other 
Administration 
Dispatch 
Documentation 
Engineering 
Human Resource 
Information Technology 
Management 
Material Support 
Production Planning and Control 
Purchasing 
Quality Assurance 
Safety 
Security 
Training 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
104 17.2 17.2 
13 2.1 19.3 
8 1.3 20.7 
12 2.0 22.6 
5 .8 23.5 
4 .7 24.1 
7 1.2 25.3 
179 29.6 54.9 
9 1.5 56.4 
1 .2 56.5 
125 20.7 77.2 
1 .2 77.4 
61 10.1 87.4 
4 
1 
1 
9 
2 
1 
3 
12 
5 
2 
11 
3 
1 
1 
.7 
.2 
.2 
1.5 
.3 
.2 
.5 
2.0 
.8 
.3 
1.8 
.5 
.2 
.2 
88.1 
88.3 
88.4 
89.9 
90.2 
90.4 
90.9 
92.9 
93.7 
94.0 
95.9 
96.4 
96.5 
96.7 
Not Classified 
Total 
20 3.3 100.0 
605 100.0 
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Question 23 shows the titles of participants, and the results are listed in Table 21. 
Mechanics and operators had the most participation (59.3%). There were 12.6% of 
participants who were managers and 13.4% of them who were supervisors. Other 
participants included (a) engineers (4.8%), (b) staff (2.5%), (c) inspectors (1.5%), and (d) 
others. 
Table 21 
Titles of Participants. 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
76 
81 
359 
5 
1 
1 
1 
2 
29 
9 
1 
2 
15 
1 
22 
605 
12.6 
13.4 
59.3 
.8 
.2 
.2 
.2 
.3 
4.8 
1.5 
.2 
.3 
2.5 
.2 
3.6 
100.0 
12.6 
26.0 
85.3 
86.1 
86.3 
86.4 
86.6 
86.9 
91.7 
93.2 
93.4 
93.7 
96.2 
96.4 
100.0 
Manager 
Supervisor 
Mechanic or Operator 
Auditor 
President 
Confidential 
Contractor 
Controller 
Engineer 
Inspector 
Maintenance Planner 
Researcher 
Staff 
Vice President 
Not Classified 
Total 
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Question 24 examined participants' willingness to receive the outcomes of this 
research. Only 90 participants (14.9%) presented their interests to be further informed 
about the results. The data are shown in Table 22. 
Table 22 
Willingness to Receive the Results. 
Yes 
No 
Not Classified 
Total 
Frequency 
90 
501 
14 
605 
Percent 
14.9 
82.8 
2.3 
100.0 
Comparison 
The samples in this survey study were categorized into different groups by 
participants' demographics, such as age, experience training source, and certificate 
holding. To determine whether the results have significant differences between groups, 
the researcher utilized SPSS and conducted a series of comparisons. 
Overall, there was only one significant difference regarding Question 2. The 
results of the comparison between the knowledge of Just Culture and aviation experience 
are shown in Figure 20. The three pie charts represent the differences of three experience 
levels. With the higher experience level, there was a tendency to have more participants 
who know about Just Culture. The number went from 12.33% in the group of 0 -10 years 
experience to 33.70% in the group of over 21 years experience. There was no other 
significant difference between demographic groups on other questions. 
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Figure 20. Differences between Experience Levels and the Knowledge of Just Culture 
Interview 
The strategy for the mixed research method in this research was the sequential 
explanatory strategy. This method collected and analyzed quantitative data (survey) in the 
first phase of research followed by the collection and analysis of qualitative data in the 
second phase. The qualitative data in this study played a supporting role to the primary 
quantitative data. 
During the process of the interview, the qualitative data were recorded and 
categorized. Due to the fact that all of the participants preferred to be interviewed in 
Chinese, the data needed to be translated into English before analysis. There were three 
interviewees who requested to answer the interview questions via telephone calls. Due to 
the difficulties of interview timing, the other six interviewees chose to answer the 
interview questions via e-mail. The following sections contained descriptions about the 
results of those interviews. 
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Open-ended Questions 
The open-ended questions were designed to examine (a) the factors influencing 
TACARE's effectiveness, (b) the issues of voluntary reporting in a maintenance 
organization, and (c) possible solutions to improve the utilization of TACARE. There 
were nine open-ended questions. The answers to Questions 1 to 9 are presented in the 
following sections. The numbers of respondents for each question are included. The 
frequencies of those common answers of each question are also listed. 
Question 1 illustrated the understandings of TACARE principles. All nine • 
interviewees answered this question, and the results are listed in Table 23. There were 
three interviewees who do not know the principles of TACARE. Other interviewees had 
knowledge about TACARE, but only partially. 
Table 23 
Understandings of TACARE principles. 
Answers Frequency 
1. Voluntary 
2. Submit safety recommendations 
3. Provide confidentiality and immunity for participants 
4. Identify safety hazards to prevent accident 
5. Is developed by ASC to share safety information 
6. There are TACARE newsletters on the company's bullitin 
board. 
7. Only heard the term - TACARE 
8. None 
3 
1 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 
2 
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Question 2 examined the issues that impact the effectiveness of TACARE. The 
results (Table 24) show that there was (a) no action from TACARE, (b) only little 
information about it, and (c) difficulty to utilize the reporting procedure. Therefore, 
TACARE was not commonly used. 
Table 24 
Effectiveness of TACARE. 
Answers Frequency 
1. Insufficient Information and feedback to the stakeholders 2 
2. Not enough promotion to air carriers 1 
3. No actual corrective or preventive actions from TACARE 2 
4. VDRP is commonly utilized 1 
5. Could be easier to submit report with multiple choice 1 
questionnaire and web-based system 
6. Only knows by researchers and people who go through ASC 1 
training courses 
Total Respondents 7 
Question 3 discussed the benefits of the existing reporting system in the 
organization. Even though it is not a voluntary program, the interviewees believed there 
were safety improvements from their in-house reporting system. The benefits were listed 
in Table 25. Only one interviewee suggested that there was no change from those reports. 
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Table 25 
Benefits from In-house Reporting System. 
Answers Frequency 
1. Improve controls on equipment and personnel 1 
2. Additions and replacement on safety equipment 1 
3. More emphasize on the inspection of working environment 1 
safety 
4. Positive attitude toward safety 2 
5. Reward and punishment 1 
6. High standards from the management . 2 
7. Strictly follow CAA's regulation and company's Standard 2 
Operation Procedures (SOPs) as part of the company culture 
8. Corrective or preventive actions are taken rapidly after 1 
reporting 
9. Case study in annual recurrent MRM training 
10. Safety notices in job task cards 
11. Quick emergency responses 
12. Each department has its own safety reporting beside the 
company one 
13. Modified procedures 
14. Safety record keeping 
15. The establishment of independent safety and health 
department 
16. There is no signifiacnt change since the safety of aircraft 
maintenance is managed by the company 
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Question 4 demonstrated the benefits of implementing SMS. The results (Table 
26) suggested that the company has had a positive safety culture. With the 
implementation of SMS, safety was being enhanced even more. There were positive 
attitudes among employees and systematic approaches to improve safety. 
Table 26 
Benefits from SMS. 
Answers Frequency 
1. Significantly reduce the incident rate
 # 2 
2. Safety Policy 2 
3. Employees are not hiding any incident 3 
4. Positive attitude toward reporting in a timely manner 1 
5. Surveillance and Inspection Reporting 2 
6. Statistics Analysis and records 2 
7. The utilization of SRM in every aspect of the company 
8. The raise of safety awareness among employees 
9. SMS Training 
10. Regularly safety meetings 
11. No matter there is SMS or not, safety cultre is there in the 
company 
Total Respondents 9 
The results of Question 5 (Table 27) showed the different aspects of promoting 
TACARE. They consisted of three parts: (a) challenges, (b) advantages, and (c) concerns. 
The issue of trust between authority and reporter remained a major challenge. However, 
there were strengths in positive company culture and audits from foreign customers. 
Finally, the willingness of sharing information was a great concern. 
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Table 27 
Different Aspects of Promoting TACARE. 
Answers Frequency 
Challenges 
1. The trustworthy of confidentiality 1 
2. Social Culture, PD 2 
3. The conflicts between TACARE, company's QA system, and 1 
CAA's oversight 
4. The consequence against the company after reporting a 1 
problem 
5. Continuous improvement 1 
6. The company already has in-house reporting system. There is 1 
no point to submit report to TACARE " 
Advantages 
1. The passion among maintenance personnel 1 
2. Foreign Customers with audits 2 
3. The benefit of identifying hazards 1 
4. Progressive company culture toward safety issues 1 
Concerns 
1. A rapid and effective way to relay safety information 1 
2. Passive and conservative attitudes 2 
3. TACARE is unknown by the industry 2 
4. The willingness to share personal experience 1 
5. The company posseses the authority of safety, and TACARE 1 
can not get involved. 
Total Respondents 8 
Question 6 shows interviewees' knowledge about Just Culture. The answers from 
interviewees (Table 28) consistently showed that they had no knowledge about Just 
Culture. 
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Table 28 
Knowledge about Just Culture. 
Answers Frequency 
1. None 8 
Total Respondents 8 
Question 7 examined interviewee's understandings on the company's safety 
policy. Most of the interviewees were aware of the safety policy in place, but there were 
two interviewees who had no knowledge or were unclear of a company safety policy. The 
responses (Table 29) revealed that the company's safety policy did not provide 
confidentiality and immunity to the reporter (n=l). The reports went through open 
investigation and shared with the public (n=3). The company's reporting program had a 
group of subject matter experts to review incident reports (n=3). Then, the company took 
disciplinary actions to unacceptable behaviors and rewarded the good ones (n=2). 
Table 29 
Understandings of Company's Safety Policy. 
Answers Frequency 
1. Yes, 80 percent confidence 1 
2. No 1 
3. Unclear about the policy 1 
4. Policy is in the SMS manual, and employees are all 1 
acknowledged 
5. Committee Review 3 
6. Just and open to public investigation 3 
7. Public information sharing 2 
8. Standards for acceptable and unacceptable with reward and 2 
punishment 
9. The company has full authority on the issues of safety policy, 1 
such as confidentiality and imunity 
Total Respondents 8 
88 
Question 8 was designed to understand possible means to improve the safety 
culture in the organization. Table 30 shows interviewees' belief on the ways to promote 
safety through different forms of training and communication. 
Table 30 
Methods of Improving Safety Culture. 
Answers Frequency 
1. Education on Just Culture 1 
2. SMS training courses 1 
3. Recurrent training with case studies 3 
4. Field experience sharing 1 
5. Active and direct communication and information sharing 2 
between CAA, ASC, and MRO 
6. Web based Training 2 
7. Continuous feedbacks from safety reports 1 
Total Respondents 8 
The results of Question 9 presented all the other comments. Table 31 addressed 
the feedback from interviewees. The main idea among those was the free flow of 
information between (a) regulatory oversight, (b) management, and (c) employees. 
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Table 31 
Other Comments. 
Answers Frequency 
CAA 
1. Mandate the industry to relay safety information to employees 1 
2. Information sharing and trust besides regulatory oversight 3 
3. Effective oversight that helps solving safety issues 1 
4. Provide assistance for aviation safety 1 
ASC 
1. Hold safety conference regularly with the industry 1 
2. Information sharing and trust besides accident investigation 1_ 
Safety Director 
1. Case studies as part of safety audits 1 
Quality Assurance 
1. QA Notice 2 
2. Confidential safety reports in the training material 1 
Management 
1. Direct channel to CEO through intranet (f=2) 2 
2. Provide disclosure channel with immunity for reporting 1 
safety issues 
3. Build up safety culture as top priority 1 
Safety Reward Program 
1. Reward people may be a positive way to encourage reporting 1 
Total Respondents 8 
Demographics 
There were a total of nine interviewees, and there was one who did not wish to 
respond to the demographic question. Results of demographic data from the remaining 
eight interviewees were quantified. All of the respondents were male. The average age 
was 44.25. The range of age was from 40 to 48. The average number of years in aviation 
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experience was 18.5 with 25 years being the highest and 14 years being the lowest. All 
eight respondents had an aviation related bachelor's degree. Also, all of them held CAA 
aircraft maintenance certificates, and five of them held FAA A&P certificates. Three 
interviewees were senior quality engineers, and five interviewees were managers. Their 
responsibilities included (a) inspection, (b) investigation, (c) auditing, (d) training, and (e) 
production planning. 
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Chapter V 
DISCUSSION 
The mixed method design used in this research was developed to acquire a 
general understanding of Taiwan's aircraft maintenance industry through a quantitative 
data collection that was analyzed to identify the reasons for the participants' 
understanding of the safety programs. The purpose of the survey was to measure and 
examine the attitudes of Taiwanese maintenance personnel associated with voluntary 
safety reporting programs. The results were not intended to represent the opinions of all 
Taiwanese maintenance personnel; nevertheless, the sampling results represented the 
perspective in Taiwan's aircraft maintenance and service organizations. The interview 
was designed to obtain information in depth beyond what was possible to acquire from 
the survey. The interview was a case study of one single maintenance organization and 
characterized the reasons of the survey results. 
Knowledge about Voluntary Safety Programs 
The first question of the survey was designed to measure participants' knowledge 
level of various voluntary safety programs that were widely utilized in the U.S. and 
worldwide. The results showed that SMS was known by 55% of participants. Even 
though the CAA in Taiwan has published an Advisory Circular (AC) with the guidelines 
and mandated that each air carrier must have an SMS program, it is still only known by 
half of the respondents in those maintenance organizations. This result shows the lack of 
knowledge about SMS among employees in the organization. Nevertheless, the responses 
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from the interviews suggested that people acknowledged the benefits of SMS to 
significantly reduce the safety incident rate. 
ASRS and lOSA were known by 46.4% of respondents. ASRS has been 
well-known by the aviation community around the world and recognized as the most 
successful voluntary safety reporting program. Since its policy applies to the users in the 
NAS alone, the program can only be utilized in the U.S. The accessibility of the safety 
information in ASRS was limited for the aviation community in Taiwan. Most of the air 
carriers in Taiwan are members of the International Aviation Transportation Association 
(IATA). lOSA had been awarded to some of the Taiwanese air carriers and was 
recognized by many maintenance organizations in Taiwan. However, not every employee 
shared the same knowledge in an organization. In recent years, FOQA has become a 
widely accepted voluntary safety program worldwide and was implemented into most of 
the Taiwanese air carrier operations. It is not only for flight safety, but also for aircraft 
performance monitoring. FOQA involved technical fields in aircraft maintenance; thus, it 
was recognized by a number of respondents (27.1%) in the survey. 
Overall, the maintenance personnel did have partial knowledge about voluntary 
safety programs. Within the Taiwanese air carrier industry, it is believed that only people 
with positions directly or partially related to safety have an obligation to familiarize 
themselves with these programs. The results of interview did suggest that ICAO, IATA, 
and foreign business partners did facilitate some of those programs in Taiwan, such as 
SMS and IOSA. The air carrier and MRO facility were required to have them in order to 
operate internationally and have contract maintenance from foreign airlines. 
Understanding and implementing those voluntary programs was absolutely essential for 
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their international business. However, most of the employees were still lacking in 
knowledge about those voluntary safety programs. 
Understandings of TACARE 
The survey showed that over 60% of respondents knew about TACARE, but only 
3.6% of them had used it before. Over 90% of respondents believed the importance of 
submitting safety reports and showed their willingness to participate the TACARE 
system. In the interview, most of the interviewees showed their understandings about 
TACARE, but most of their knowledge came from their own readings from TACARE's 
website and newsletter. They did not fully understand the policy and functions of 
TACARE, which caused them not to submit reports to the TACARE system. Many 
participants in this research were not even aware the existence of the TACARE system. 
There were a variety of reasons for maintenance personnel not to participate in 
TACARE. From the survey data, the unfamiliarity about TACARE's reporting 
procedures (n=143) got the highest count of respondents among those reasons. The 
interview supported the survey data. Interviewees showed there was very little 
information about TACARE for maintenance personnel. There was not enough 
promotion from ASC, and TACARE was only known by a small group of people who 
had attended ASC's training. Also, there was insufficient safety related information from 
TACARE. It did not provide feedback to the participants, and there were no corrective or 
preventive action taken after reporting. 
Even though the TACARE system was not successful, all the maintenance 
organizations in Taiwan had implemented their own in-house reporting programs. The 
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in-house reporting program in Taiwan did not resemble the ASAP program in the U.S. air 
carrier system. It was mandatory for employees to submit a report after a noticeable 
incident involved property damage or personnel injury. The program did not provide any 
confidentiality and immunity for the reporter. The company punished unacceptable 
behaviors with disciplinary actions and rewarded the achievement of good safety records. 
However, the interviewees believed that the company did have a fair and just 
investigation for each incident. There were specific committees to address different safety 
issues, and then corrective or preventive measures were taken rapidly. The interview 
showed that those in-house incident reports have helped improve safety in many ways. 
The strength of having a safety reporting program was well-acknowledged by 
interviewees. 
Safety Culture in Taiwanese Maintenance Organization 
Safety culture is comprised of (a) Just Culture, (b) reporting culture, and (c) 
learning culture. A well-developed voluntary safety program requires a healthy safety 
culture to support it as the foundation of trust between the authority and participants. As 
the results of the survey and interview showed, culture issues remain a great threat for 
establishing a voluntary safety reporting program in Taiwan. 
In the results of the survey, over 80% of respondents have not heard of the term 
"Just Culture." Among the respondents, only 13.2% of them believed that they 
understood the concepts of Just Culture. The qualitative data from the interview also 
demonstrated the same result. All of the interviewees had not heard of Just Culture and 
were not able to describe any of its concepts. The interview results did show that the 
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company has its own safety policy for incident and accident investigation. There were 
safety committees to review the material from in-house reporting programs and to take 
actions toward resolving the problems. Some interviewees thought the company 
demonstrated fair judgments with punishment and reward. The problem was that the 
company has full authority to define the terms and conditions in the Just Culture; hence, 
the employees did not fully recognize the line between acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviors. In summary, both the survey and interview indicated that the maintenance 
personnel in Taiwan do not receive and understand the concepts of just culture 
completely. 
Most of the respondents (73.9%) in the survey showed that it is everyone's 
responsibility to report safety problems and help ensure the safety of maintenance 
operations. However, people did not show their full confidence in a voluntary reporting 
program. Many believed that only the CAA or the company have the authority for 
confidentiality and immunity. There were existing conflicts between the functions of 
TACARE, the company's Quality Assurance (QA) system, and the CAA's oversight. 
Although the CAA has drafting a legislation to provide confidentiality and immunity to 
the participants in the TACARE system, the fear of the consequences toward the 
company and the individual still remained. Unless there is solid protection in place, 
people would remain passive and conservative about sharing mistakes and experiences. 
Most of the respondents in the survey also believed that the CAA and ASC should 
be held accountable for the TACARE system. However, the results of the interview 
showed that both the CAA and ASC did not provide any feedback to the participants or 
action toward the safety issue. There were no physical improvements from the TACARE 
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system, which resulted in the lack of interest for people to utilize the system. Although 
each organization already has its own reporting system, there were still problems in 
relaying safety information. The information from the in-house reporting system was 
only shared within the company. There was no effective channel and platform (e.g., the 
ASIAS in the U.S.) to share safety information between the aviation industry, CAA, and 
ASC. Also, the lack of data in the TACARE system made it impossible to conduct long 
term research about safety issues; thus, the TACARE system was not able to make 
continuous safety improvement. 
The Influences of Chinese Culture 
Chinese culture had been the overall factor that influences the establishment of 
safety culture in the TACARE system. The culture dominates everything at both the 
social and organizational levels, which becomes the major challenge in Just Culture, 
reporting culture, and learning culture. As Gerard Hendrik Hofstede (1978) defined, the 
characteristics of Chinese culture were (a) high Power Distance (PD), (b) collectivism, (c) 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA), and (d) masculinity. The results from both the survey and 
interview showed those characteristics dominate the culture in those maintenance 
organizations and have major influences on the success of voluntary reporting. 
The high Power Distance (PD) in Taiwanese society still exists. Subordinates treat 
their superiors with high respect and are not in a position to question their superiors' 
decisions in the organization. Thus, the mechanics or operators are reluctant to report any 
safety problems they found since they believe it is not their responsibility. The same 
principle also applied to the relationship between the authority and company. This 
97 
supported the finding from the interviews whereby maintenance organizations encourage 
their employees to report any safety problem to their in-house safety reporting system 
first. People would choose to report to TACARE only if the company could not be 
trusted. 
In Taiwanese society, collectivism made people reluctant to "snitch" on someone 
and break the harmony of the group. It also created a tremendous social pressure about 
any public event, especially for any aircraft accident or incident. The CAA and ASC were 
often under the pressure of the politics and the media. Consequently, this also put a 
company or an individual contributing to the safety problem under huge pressure, which 
interfered with the investigation of the problem. This social pressure also evolved into a 
shame culture making an individual or an organization sensitive to losing its reputation. 
People were afraid that their mistakes would be made known to the public. Therefore, an 
individual would be generally reluctant to voluntarily submit an incident report to the 
company or the TACARE system. The maintenance organization would also refuse to 
release safety information related to an incident caused by its own employees to the CAA, 
ASC, or other company. 
The characteristics previously mentioned also form a punishment culture in 
Taiwanese society. Many survey respondents and interviewees expressed their fear of 
disciplinary action by their companies as a result of submitting TACARE reports. Unlike 
Western cultures where disciplinary actions were the last resource of corrective actions, 
in Taiwan, punishment has often been the only solution to most problems regardless of 
the root causes. In fact, the punishment culture had not concentrated on identifying the 
root cause of a problem, but utilized forms of punishment to prevent further similar 
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occurrences. As a result, this action contributed to the difficulty of implementing a 
voluntary reporting program, such as TACARE. 
In the aviation industry, the composition in gender resulted in masculinity. The 
characteristics in competitiveness, assertiveness, and ambition resulted in the aggressive 
actions in the career, which may jeopardize safety by poor decision making. However, 
Chinese culture still has a code of honor. People desire to achieve great things and stand 
out as the leader in the group. 
The Acceptance on the Terms of Voluntary Reporting 
In the survey, there were a series of Likert-type-scale questions about the 
possibility of adopting ASAP principles into the TACARE system. By accepting those 
principles, the TACARE system might be able to improve its overall effectiveness. The 
majority of respondents (96.5%) believed that a well-organized voluntary reporting 
program would enhance safety. This indicated most of the maintenance personnel in 
Taiwan understood the value and importance of a voluntary reporting program. Most of 
the respondents (93.5%) also agreed that the program should provide protections for 
reporter's personal information. Although both the TACARE system and in-house 
reporting programs did not establish the legal protections about reporter's information, 
confidentiality was highly recognized as one of the means to improve the participation of 
the TACARE system. 
For the concept of event reviewing, over 97% of the respondents agreed that 
safety reports should be reviewed by a group of aviation safety experts and investigators. 
This result was consistent with the information gained from the interview. Interviewees 
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suggested that the company has various committees (e.g., human factors, environment, 
and health) to review the incident reports from its in-house reporting program, and the 
preventive or corrective actions were taken rapidly afterward. However, there was no 
evidence showing that the TACARE system has a well-functioned Event Review 
Committee (ERC) similar to the ASAP program, which is consisted of subject matter 
experts. Thus, the TACARE system was not able to collaborate with the CAA and the 
industry, determine the root cause of an incident, and develop solutions to prevent 
reoccurrence. The survey also investigated the participants' attitude regarding the 
inclusion of an employee representative on the ERC. The acceptance of this concept was 
slightly lower than other agreements. In Taiwanese aviation industry, there was no 
official form of unions among those aviation firms. The concept of having representatives 
to negotiate terms with the company was very weak, especially for maintenance 
personnel. As a result, the respondents of the survey showed that an employee 
representative may not necessarily be included in the ERC to stand for the reporters in the 
program. 
The concept of defining acceptable and unacceptable behaviors was accepted by 
most of the respondents. In a Just Culture, acceptable behaviors were being tolerated, and 
unacceptable behaviors were treated with disciplinary actions. Most of the respondents in 
the survey agreed that there should be a fine line between unintentional accidents or slips 
and intentional acts. However, the acceptance of immunity for acceptable behavior and 
punishment for unacceptable behaviors was relatively low. Since the concepts of Just 
Culture were not fully understood and accepted by the maintenance personnel in Taiwan, 
the punishment culture still dominated the process of accident or incident investigation. 
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The final part asked if unanimous consensus must be reached by all members of 
the ERC on a safety report. In order to ensure a fair judgment during investigation, this 
was a critical principle for an ASAP program. The ERC should consist of the 
representatives from the FAA, the management, and the employee. Unanimous consensus 
signified all participating parties were in agreement with necessary actions toward a 
safety report. Since the maintenance personnel in Taiwan did not fully understand this 
principle, the acceptance was slightly lower (83.6%) than other common principles (e.g., 
confidentiality) for a voluntary reporting program. Overall, the maintenance personnel in 
Taiwan accepted and agreed with the ASAP principles. The survey results confirmed the 
possibility of adapting ASAP principles into the TACARE system. 
Demographics 
In the Taiwan aviation industry, the male had dominated over the female as the 
vast majority of aircraft maintenance personnel are male. This showed that the entire 
population of maintenance personnel in Taiwan was under influence of Chinese culture. 
In the comparison between survey questionnaire and demographics, one significant 
difference was found. There was a positive trend in the relationship of aviation 
experience level and the knowledge of Just Culture. The result of this comparison showed 
that the percentage of respondents who knew Just Culture is 12.33% in the level of 0-10 
years and 33.70% in the level of over 21 years. This trend was caused by the diverse time 
that respondents work in the aviation industry. With longer time in the industry, the 
maintenance personnel in Taiwan tend to receive more and various training and education, 
which lead them to have more opportunities to hear about Just Culture. 
The survey results indicated that most of the respondents (n=481) received their 
maintenance training from the company itself. The primary contributing reason was 
Taiwan's educational system. There were only three universities that offer the same 
aviation-related program - Aerospace Engineering, and few colleges have programs 
related to aircraft maintenance or avionics. Moreover, there were only a few elective 
courses regarding safety in those academic institutions that were aviation-related. 
Students were usually not urged by professors to take these courses. The main reason is 
that these safety-related courses have been recognized as less important and not relevant 
to aerospace engineering. National Cheng Keng University is the only university in 
Taiwan that provides safety-related courses at the graduate level. However, the program 
lacks in materials and resources about aviation safety compared to programs in the U.S., 
and there were also limited number of students. As a result, the maintenance personnel in 
Taiwan often did not receive formal initial training regarding safety. Most of them were 
recruited from non-aviation professions and entered the company with less than adequate 
knowledge in aviation. 
Since the CAA in Taiwan does not mandate that all maintenance workers be 
required to have a maintenance certificate to perform maintenance on aircraft, the 
numbers of respondents who hold maintenance certificates was low. Half of respondents 
(n=305) hold CAA's mechanic certificates; among them, only 79 respondents also hold 
FAA's A&P certificates. This discrepancy resulted from different training sources. In 
Taiwan's maintenance organization, the mechanics usually gained their certificates as 
they have more experience, and the formal training for certificate qualification was 
sponsored by the company. Holding a certificate often meant more responsibility as an 
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inspector or supervisor who signs off the work. However, the differences in the 
company's training for each employee resulted in the inconsistencies among employees 
regarding the knowledge of safety. 
Chapter VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
A voluntary safety reporting program, such as the TACARE system, has proven 
to be an effective way to improve safety. It is not just identifying human's unsafe acts, 
but also providing a better view of the latent risks that lead to those unsafe acts. The 
TACARE system signifies Taiwan's efforts to improve aviation safety proactively, 
instead of reactively investigating aircraft accident. Even though the industry recognized 
the importance and benefits of having a voluntary safety reporting program, there was 
only minimum participation in the TACARE system, especially for aircraft maintenance 
personnel. The following conclusions demonstrate the reasons of little utilization by 
maintenance personnel in Taiwan and also their acceptance on the concepts of a 
voluntary safety reporting program. 
One of the principal findings from both the quantitative and qualitative research 
was that the maintenance personnel in Taiwan lacked knowledge about voluntary safety 
programs. Even if the programs (e.g., TACARE, SMS, and IOSA) have been established 
for years in the Taiwanese aviation industry, there are still a lot of people who do not 
know anything about them. The research also suggested that many maintenance 
personnel in Taiwan were unfamiliar about TACARE's reporting procedures, which 
caused them not to submit a safety report to this system. People did not receive 
information about the TACARE system or other voluntary safety programs. Also, the 
majority of people did not know about the concepts of Just Culture, which are considered 
as the foundation of all voluntary safety programs. In other words, the ASC did not 
promote the TACARE system and educate on the concepts of the Just Culture 
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successfully, and the companies did not offer sufficient training about voluntary safety 
programs to all of their employees. 
Secondly, the participants in this research revealed that there was no feedback to 
the reporter after reports were submitted to the TACARE system and no improvement 
from the results of the TACARE reports. Therefore, even if some of maintenance 
personnel were aware of the TACARE system, they are still reluctant to participate in the 
system. The fear of punishment still exists among the maintenance personnel in Taiwan 
as well. Since no legislation about the protections and immunity to the participants x>f the 
TACARE system were implemented, there is no immunity or guarantee for non-punitive 
actions toward the reporters. The safety policies in those maintenance organizations in 
Taiwan were also unclear to their employees. Thus, both the authorities (e.g., the CAA 
and ASC) and those maintenance organizations are still under the influences of Chinese 
culture. 
Finally, the results of this research indicated that the maintenance personnel in 
Taiwan are willing to adopt the principles of the ASAP program into the TACARE 
system. However, they had not receive information about the ASAP program before and 
were not able to understand those principles, such as confidentiality and the ERC. The 
results of demographics showed that most of the maintenance personnel in Taiwan only 
received the training from their companies. There is no formal aircraft maintenance 
training school in Taiwan, which offers the initial training and allows the candidates to be 
certified by the CAA. The education in safety within the Taiwanese educational system is 
also limited for aviation professions. Therefore, most of the maintenance personnel in 
Taiwan did not receive enough knowledge of the safety in aircraft maintenance. 
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Chapter Vll 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Through the TACARE system, SMS, and the companies' in-housevreporting 
programs, the CAA, ASC, and the aircraft maintenance industry have been taking steps to 
create a proactive safety reporting system. From the results of this research, the 
researcher found that several actions could be taken to enhance the safety in aircraft 
maintenance and achieve the full potential of the TACARE system. 
Maintenance personnel in Taiwan lack knowledge about the TACARE system 
and other voluntary safety programs. It is recommended that educating maintenance 
personnel to a certain knowledge level regarding voluntary safety programs is considered 
essential. The CAA should also standardize the criteria for certification of aircraft 
maintenance personnel. There should be formal aircraft maintenance training schools 
providing initial training with basic safety knowledge. Every mechanic should go through 
the aircraft maintenance training first and then be certified by the CAA as an aircraft 
mechanic. The maintenance organizations should also offer more formal and recurrent 
training on safety, such as SMS, Just Culture, and case studies from voluntary safety 
programs. 
Proper safety courses should be provided by the aviation related education 
institutions in Taiwan. Since the aircraft maintenance industry lacks information on the 
concepts of voluntary safety programs, the education system in Taiwan should provide 
more programs about aviation safety and cooperate with the industry closely to supply 
sufficient safety specialists into the workforce. With more and more education on 
voluntary safety programs, the maintenance organizations in Taiwan would be able to 
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incorporate some of the principles more easily; then, the maintenance personnel in 
Taiwan would be more willing to accept and participate in those voluntary safety 
programs. 
Instead of overseeing the maintenance organizations in Taiwan through 
inspections and accident or incident investigations, the CAA and ASC should emphasize 
their efforts on promoting the concepts of voluntary reporting to let more people 
understand the functions of the TACARE system. The CAA and ASC should hold safety 
conferences regularly and provide the latest safety information for all maintenance -
personnel. There also should be a direct medium of exchange between the authorities and 
the industry to share safety information. Perhaps a platform like ASIAS in the U.S would 
serve as a bridge between the TACARE system and those companies' in-house reporting 
programs and would be beneficial to increase the overall effectiveness of safety 
enhancement. 
In addition, the CAA and ASC should put the legislation of voluntary reporting in 
place as soon as possible to provide protections to its participants and establish a 
non-punitive environment in aircraft maintenance industry. Due to the characteristics of 
masculinity in Chinese culture, one can also consider a way to reward a group or 
individual for participating in the system. By giving a reward to an individual or a group 
with distinguished performance, one could be considered as a respectful person who 
reaches great achievements in one's career. Instead of punishing with disciplinary actions, 
a mechanism of rewarding participants in the TACARE system would be feasible and 
might increase the willingness of participation. 
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% / ' EMBMY-miDDLE 
. * #& . . AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY 
The TAiwan Civil Aviation safety REporting (TACARE) System 
in Aircraft Maintenance 
Dear Participants, 
I am a graduate student of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona 
Beach, Florida, USA. I am studying voluntary incident reporting programs for 
maintenance personnel, and I would greatly appreciate your input to my survey. I realize 
that you are very busy; and completion of the survey should require not more than 10-35 
minutes of your time. Please return the completed survey to the survey collection box. 
This survey is designed to examine the effectiveness of voluntary incident 
reporting programs for maintenance personnel. All the information will be treated 
confidentially and reported in the aggregate. The resultant data will be analyzed as part of 
my master degree's thesis. I will strictly respect the confidentiality of all participants' 
input. If you are a participant, and if you desire, I will provide you with a copy of the 
outcomes of my study. Please return the survey with your business card or contact 
information to indicate your interest in receiving a copy of the results. 
Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
Sincerely yours, 
Yi-Fan (Tom) Chen 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, FL, U.S.A. 
Master of Science in Aeronautics Graduate Student 
chemant;3Q u Hotmail cum 
chem a mv erau edo 
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TACARE Survey 
Question 1 and 2 is inquiry about the knowledge of voluntary safety programs. 
1. Which U.S. voluntary safety program(s) are you familiar with? Please select all the following 
safety reporting program(s) that you have heard about or utilized. (Choose all that apply.) 
a. Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
b. Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) 
c. Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) 
d. Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) 
e. Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) 
f. Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP) 
g. Internal Evaluation Program (IEP) 
h. Safety Management System (SMS) 
i. IATA Operations Safety Audit (IOSA) 
2.Have you heard of the term "Just Culture"? 
a. Yes. (Please proceed to question 2-A and the followings) 
b. No. (Please proceed to question 3) 
2-A. Do you feel you are well-educated on the concepts of Just Culture? 
a. Yes. b. No. 
Question 3-6 consist of inquiries regard the usage of TAiwan Confidential Aviation safety 
REporting (TACARE) system. 
3. Are you familiar with the TAiwan Confidential Aviation safety REporting system (TACARE)? 
a. Yes, and 1 have used it c. No, I am not aware of TACARE 
b. Yes, but 1 have not used it d. No, it is no importance to me 
4. Do you think it is important to submit a report to TACARE in the event of a maintenance error? 
a. Yes (Please proceed to question 5-A and 6 through 15) 
b. No (Please proceed to question 5-B and 6 through 15) 
5-A. Who do you believe should have the responsibility to submit reports to TACARE in the 
event of a 
maintenance error? 
a. Supervisor 
b. Mechanic or operator 
c. Inspector 
d. Anyone who saw the problem 
5-B. 1 am reluctant to participate in TACARE because (Select any/all that apply from the list 
below): 
a. The probability of disciplinary action(s) from my airline 
b. The lack of confidence on the immunity of TACARE system 
c. My unfamiliarity with the TACARE reporting procedures 
d. I do not believe a submission of a TACARE report would not improve flight safety 
e. The company has its own reporting procedure, so TACARE is irrelevant. 
f. Other reason(s) for choosing not to participate: 
(Please be specific) 
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6. Who do you believe should be in charge of the confidential data collected by TACARE? 
a. Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) c. Aviation Safety Council (ASC) 
b. Independent non-govemment agency d. The air carrier 
Questions 7-15 consist of general statements regarding the concept of voluntary incident 
reporting program, please respond to each statement below by circling the choice best 
described your feeling. 
l=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 3= Disagree, 4= Strongly Disagree. 
8. 
A well-organized voluntary incident reporting 
program enhances flight safety. 
The information in incident reports should be 
de-identified and remain anonymous for the public. 
9. Confidential incident reports should be reviewed 
by a team of safety experts and investigators. 
10. An employee representative should be included 
as part of the incident report review team. 
11. The organization should draw a line and define 
what are acceptable (human errors and at-risk 
behaviors) and unacceptable (reckless) behaviors. 
12. Participants who committed human errors or 
at-risk behaviors should be protected from legal 
and airline disciplinary actions. 
13. The program should not accept and provide 
immunity for reckless behaviors. 
14. Unanimous consensus must be reached by all 
members of the incident report review team on 
event reported. 
15. The program should create rapid, useful, 
accessible, and intelligible feedbacks to the 
reporting community. 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
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16. Gender 
a. Male b. Female 
Demographics 
17. Nationality 
a. Taiwanese/Chinese b. Foreign National 
18. What is your age? 
a. 18-30 b. 31-40 c. 41-50 d. 51-60 e. 61 + 
19. How many years of aircraft maintenance experience do you have? 
a. 0-10 b. 11-20 cover 20 
20. Source of primary training? 
a. Military 
b. Airline training program 
c. Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) training school 
d. College 
e. Other: (Please specify) 
21. What maintenance license or certificate do you currently hold? (Choose all that apply.) 
a. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) Certificate 
b. Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) Mechanic License 
c. None. 
d. Other(s): (Please specify) 
22. What area of ground operations are you serving in? 
a. Line maintenance 
b. Hangar maintenance 
c. Shop maintenance 
d. Ground services and Ramp operations 
e. Other: (Please specify) 
23. Which title best describes your job position? 
a. Manager 
b. Supervisor 
c. Mechanic/Operator 
d. Other: _ _ (Please specify) 
24. Will you interest in the results of this research project? 
a. Yes. (Please write down your e-mail: 
b. No. 
NOTE: If you have any comments, please feel free to utilize the back(s) ofthepage(s). If your 
comments are specific to a question, please include a reference to the question number. Once 
again: Thank you for your participation! 
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EMBRY-RIDDLE 
,..£,.:'<. AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY 
The TAiwan Civil Aviation safety REporting (TACARE) System 
in Aircraft Maintenance 
Dear Participants, 
1 am a graduate student of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona 
Beach, Florida, USA. 1 am studying voluntary incident reporting programs for 
maintenance personnel, and 1 would greatly appreciate your input to my research. I am 
currently conducting interviews with experts in the area of voluntary safety reporting 
programs. You have been identified as a possible participant in the study. 
This interview is designed to examine the effectiveness of voluntary incident 
reporting programs for maintenance personnel in Taiwan. All the information will be 
treated confidentially and reported in the aggregate. The resultant data will be analyzed as 
part of my master degree's thesis. 1 will strictly respect the confidentiality of all 
participants" input. If you are a participant and if you desire, I will provide you with a 
copy of the outcomes of my study. 
The interview is designed to be approximately 15 minutes long, and the interview 
questions are attached for your review. If you are available, 1 would like to set up a time 
to be in contact with you that would best suit your schedule. If you are willing to 
participate, please inform me of your best time and the phone number for contacting you. 
1 look forward to speaking with you and sincerely appreciate your time and effort. 
Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
Sincerely yours, 
Yi-Fan (Tom) Chen 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, FL, U.S.A. 
Master of Science in Aeronautics Graduate Student 
chencanq30 a hotmail a>in 
chen\ a m\ erau edit 
Interview Topics 
1. Are you familiar with the TACARE system? If yes, please describe your 
understanding. 
2. If you know about the TACARE system, what is your opinion of the effectiveness of 
the TACARE system? (If not applicable, please skip to Question 3) 
3. What improvements have you observed in your company's safety culture'and 
operations since the implementation of the in-house safety reporting system? 
4. Can you provide examples to show the positive changes in safety culture within your 
company after implementing the Safety Management System (SMS)? 
5. What are your thoughts concerning the incorporation of a voluntary safety reporting 
program, such as the TACARE system, into maintenance and ramp safety? 
A. Challenges 
B. Advantages 
C. Concerns 
6. Are you familiar with the concept of "Just Culture?" If yes, please describe your 
understanding. 
7. Does your company have a safety policy for voluntary incident reporting? If it does, 
please describe the level of trust on the just and confidentiality between the 
management and employees. 
8. What education or training program(s) do you think would be needed to improve 
safety culture when implementing a voluntary safety program? 
9. Please provide suggestions on any of the items below that involve aviation safety 
programs. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
Civil Aviation Administration (CAA): 
Aviation Safety Council (ASC): 
Company's Safety Committee: 
Safety Director: 
Quality Assurance: 
The Management: 
Safety Rewarding Program: 
Other: 
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Demographics of interviewee: 
Gender 
Age 
Source of and level of Education 
Professional Certificate(s) 
Years of Aviation Experience 
Job Title 
Main Responsibility 
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